Isa Buletini
Ismail Qemali kur vajti në Londër për t'u takuar me Kryeministrin e Anglisë, e shoqëronte Isa Buletini.
Isa Buletini në brez kishte vënë dy kobure.
Mirëpo, kështu të armatosur nuk e linin të hynte në kryeministri dhe bënë fjalë me të. Ismail Qemali i bëri me shenjë të dorëzonte armët.
Këtë punë e mori vesh edhe kryeministri e, në bisedim e sipër, si me të qeshur i tha Isa Buletinit:
- Sido që të jetë e çarmatosëm edhe shqiptarin.
- Shqiptarët s'ka burrë t'i çarmatosë - u përgjigj Isa Buletini dhe nxori koburen tjetër që kishte fshehur.
Flamuri është i shqiptarëve
Kur Isa Boletini po kalonte nëpër Myzeqe, në krye të trimave të tij kosovarë, për të ardhur në Vlorë më 28 nëntor 1912, një lajmëtar i doli përpara dhe i tha:
- Baca Isa, Ismail Qemali po ju pret. Ai e ngriti flamurin e Shqipërisë në Vlorë.
Dhe Isai, mendueshëm, iu përgjigj:
- Jo vetëm të Shqipërisë, more bir, por flamurin e të gjithë shqiptarëve kudo e nën këdo që të ndodhen. Ai është flamuri i të gjithë atyre që flasin shqip e kanë në dej gjak shqiptari. Dhe këtë do ta ruajnë e do ta mbajnë gjithmonë kudo që të ndodhen.
"Të pret me muzikë e të vret me thikë"
I dërguari i Stambollit i shkoi në shtëpi Isa Boletinit dhe e pyeti përse nuk doli ta priste Sulltan Reshatin kur ai erdhi në Kosovë në korrik të vitit 1911.
- Nuk mund të vija se ju më kërkuat të dorëzoja armët!
- Pse, nuk u zure besë fjalëve të sulltanit?
- Unë i zë besë vetëm grykës së pushkës që mbaj me vete. Sulltanët të kanë pritur gjithmonë me muzikë e të kanë vrarë pas shpine me thikë.
Nuk u bie në gjunjë as për kryet e nëntë djemve
Një ditë të bukur korriku të vitit 1908, kur dy djemtë e Isa Boletinit po ktheheshin në Shqipëri nga Stambolli, xhonturqit ia mbajtën peng, sepse Isai nuk kishte pranuar të shkruhej anëtar i xhemijetit. Ata e kërcënuan Isanë duke i dërguar lajmin: ose të zbriste në Mitrovicë e të shkruhej anëtar i xhemijetit, ose nuk do t'i shihte kurrë djemtë e tij.
Dhe Isa Boletini u dha këtë përgjigje:
- A, kaq për zemërpakët më mbani sa t'u bie në gjunjë për kryet e dy djemve të mi? Jo, unë nuk bie në gjunjë as për kryet e nëntë djemëve të mi…
Sidoqoftë detyra e tij është e një shërbëtori
Një ditë Isa Boletini u nis tek bashqatipi i Sulltanit për të protestuar kundër ndjekjeve politike që i bëheshin popullit kosovar. Portjeri, Halil-aga, të cilit edhe ministrat ia kishin frikën dhe i bënin komplimente, kur Isai deshi të hynte brenda i tha në mënyrë kategorike:
- Është e ndaluar!
Kur Isai u nis drejt derës Halil-aga e kapi për krahu. Atëherë Isai e kapi nga mesi dhe e rrokullisi tatëpjetë shkallëve. Natyrisht u dëgjua shamata dhe dolën të gjithë nga zyrat, me bashqatipin në krye dhe panë Halil-agën në fund të shkallëve.
Isai, si pa të keq, hyri në zyrën e bashqatipit.
- E këshilloni shërbëtorin që t'i dallojë njerëzit, - i tha.
- Nuk është shërbëtor, por njeri me gradë të lartë që kryen detyrën e portjerit.
- Sidoqoftë detyra e tij është e një shërbëtori - ia preu Isai.
Nuk i dorëzoj mysafirët e shtëpisë sime
Nga fundi i vitit 1903, dy rekrutë të krahinës së Mitrovicës patën ikur nga Shani i Bagdatit në Stamboll. Me të zbritur në një lagje të Stambollit, ata pyetën dhe gjetën shtëpinë e Isait, e cila gjendej nën vëzhgimin e policisë së Sulltanit. Kështu policia e mori vesh ku ishin strehuar dy rekrutët që kishin braktisur shërbimin ushtarak. Ajo kërkoi dorëzimin e tyre.
- Më kanë ra në shtëpi dhe janë të lodhur. Janë të njohurit e mi dhe, kur të çlodhen, do të merremi vesh - u tha ai policëve.
Pas një jave shkoi vetë komandanti i policisë Hasan Pasha. Ai i kërkoi Isait dy rekrutët për t'u gjykuar nga Ministria e Luftës.
- Ju duhet t'i kishit zënë kur rekrutët u nisën nga Shani në Stamboll, tani është turp për ju që i kërkoni dhe turp për mua që t'i dorëzoj. Për ngjarjen u njoftua Sulltan Hamiti. Ai me një letër urdhëroi të dorëzoheshin të dy rekrutët. Isai iu përgjigj:
- Djelmoshat janë bij të bjeshkës së Kosovës që nuk e durojnë dot vapën arabike dhe më parë të më vijë vdekja mua se sa të dorëzoj mysafirët e shtëpisë sime.
Idriz Seferi
Kush është gjenerali?
Të mahnitur nga qëndresa heroike që u bënë kryengritësit kosovarë ushtrive osmane në grykën e Kaçanikut më 1910, gazetarët e huaj po kërkonin me ngulm cili ishte ai gjeneral i famshëm që i drejtonte. Kur u gjetën përpara, udhëheqësit trim Idriz Seferi, e pyetën:
- Ti je gjenerali i kësaj qëndrese të pashembullt?
Idrizi, duke fërkuar mustaqet u përgjigj:
- Si unë, këtu janë të gjithë, sepse armën kundër armikut ua ka mësuar nëna që në djep. Të gjithë shqiptarët janë gjeneralë kur luftojnë për vendin e vet, por në vend të gradave në supe kemi armët e brezit.
Hil Mosi
Edhe gratë luftojnë si burrat
Kur një gazetare angleze pa duke luftuar, në Kryengritjen e Malësisë së Madhe, krah për krah burrave edhe gratë, i tha Hil Mosit:
- S'e kisha besuar që kini gra kaq trimëresha!
- Një komb trim e luftëtar si kombi shqiptar, - u përgjigj Mosi - nuk ka si të qëndrojë i tillë vetëm me burrat, në qoftë se edhe gratë nuk janë po aq trimëresha, sepse në prehrin e tyre u rritën ata që i qëndrojnë mburojë Shqipërisë!
Hasan Prishtina
Në vend të kolltukut pëlqej kryengritjen
Në valën e kryengritjeve të mëdha që shpërthyen në vitin 1911 në Kosovë, kryeministri i qeverisë osmane, Haki Pasha thirri Hasan Prishtinën, "deputetin kryengritës", siç e quanin ata, dhe i propozoi postin e ministrit, me kusht që ai të hiqte dorë nga kryengritja.
- Parimin tim - u përgjigj ai - nuk mund t'a shkel jo për një ministri, por as për postin e sulltanit. Në vend të kolltukut me turp në Stamboll, pëlqej kryengritjen me armë në dorë në malet e Kosovës.
Drejtësia serbe
Duke u gjendur ballë për ballë me ministrin e Jashtëm të qeverisë së Beogradit në selinë e Kombeve të Bashkuara në Gjenevë, Hasan Prishtina, midis të tjerave, deklaroi.
"Për të formuar një ide të përgjithëshme mbi drejtësinë serbe, mjafton të dihet se mijëra krime bëhen në mes të ditës dhe asnjë nuk ndiqet nga gjyqi. Është i vetmi vend në botë, ku njerzit mund të vriten në sy të gjykatësve që heshtin."
Dervish Hima
"Përsërite edhe njëherë, zoti prokuror"
Pasi e mbajtën të burgosur në Shkodër patriotin Dervish Hima se më 1909 kishte dënuar në një fjalim politikën e xhonturqve, për mungesë avokati e dërguan t'i bëjnë gjyqin në Selanik.
Duke iu drejtuar të pandehurit prokurori e pyeti:
- Faji yt ndëshkohet me vdekje. Fol, ç'ke për të thënë për ato që ke thënë?
- Përsëriti zoti prokuror ato që kam thënë.
Dhe prokurori duke hapur dosjen lexoi: "Ke thënë se xhonturqit janë më të poshtër se qeveria e Sulltan Hamitit dhe se shqiptarët duhet të ngrihen e të marrin armët kundër tyre. Ja vdekje, ja liri." Ja ç'ke thënë. I mohon apo i ke harruar?
- As i mohoj, as nuk i kam harruar, po kisha dëshirë t'i dëgjoja edhe nga goja juaj. Kështu do të bëjnë shqiptarët. Tani ju bëni tuajën.
As gegë, as toksë, por vetëm shqiptarë!
Në mbledhjen e Manastirit në vitin 1910, një nga përfaqësuesit e shquar të asaj kohe për çështjet shqiptare, Dervish Hima, u ngrit e tha:
- Dua të flas për Kosovën. Serbët po derdhin shumë të holla për të shkombëtarizuar vëllezrit tanë dhe thonë se vendësit e Kosovës janë më të shumtit serbë. Kurrë s'mund të bëhet që ne shqiptarët të heshtim duke parë gjithë këto gjëra që bëhen kundër nesh.
Që sot e tutje nuk do të përmendim më fjalën gegë e toskë, por vetëm shqiptarë, sepse gjithë shqiptarë jemi, të gjithë një gjuhë e një gjak kemi, të gjithë një atdhe e një qëllim të lartë kemi i cili është: përparimi i kombit shqiptar!
Dedë Gjo Luli
Në kohën e kryengritjes së Malësisë së Madhe kundër Turqisë, Dedë Gjo Lulit ju desht me u strehue në Podgoricë të Malit të Zi. Krajl Nikolla i Malit të Zi u takue me Dedën e me krenë tjetër të kryengritjes, u fal me të gjithë e ju suell Dedës me miklim:
- Dedë, tesh e ke kohën me u ba mik me mue! Jemi kojshi; pare dhe fyshekë të nap sa të duesh…
Deda i vrani vetullat dhe ju suell:
- Nuk jemi mish m'u shit ndër krraba!
Nuk kam frikë ta shoh armikun në sy.
Dedë Gjo Luli, i kapur në befasi nga ushtria serbe, me ndihmën e Gjonmarkajve, u vendos i lidhur para togës së pushkatimit.
- Lidhjani sytë - urdhëroi ushtarët e vet kapiteni serb Gjura.
- Nuk jam tradhëtar i atdheut tim - u përgjigj krenar Dedë Gjo Luli - që të vdes me sy mbyllur pa i hedhur shikimin e fundit dheut që do të më mbajë në gji. Përkundrazi, po vdes kryelartë, se gjithë jetën kam luftuar që vendi im të jetë i lirë. Dhe ju që po shkelni sot këtë vend, të jeni të sigurtë se ky dhé nuk ju mban: ose do të hyni nën të, ose do të largoheni që këtej.
Ja pse nuk kam frikë ta shikoj armikun në sy.
Pushka top!
Kral Nikolla kërkonte ta bënte për vete Dedë Gjo Lulin. Për këtë qëllim organizoi një takim në Vrellë, në verilindje të Podgoricës. Dhe aty, duke treguar se gjoja i dhimbseshin malësorët, i tha:
- Or Dedë Gjo Luli, gryka e pushkës sate është e ngushtë, vetëm duke pasur pranë e në krah Malin e Zi të bëhet pushka si grykë topi.
Deda, krenar, ia priti aty për aty:
- Me të vërtetë o Kral, gryka e pushkës time është e ngushtë, por duke u ndodhur midis maleve shqiptare, ato ma bëjnë grykën e ngushtë të pushkës sime më të gjerë e më të fuqishme se grykën e topave të ushtrisë sate.
Pushkë e ngritur për Shqipërinë
Nga fillimi i vitit 1913, Dedë Gjo Luli shkoi në Vlorë për t'u takuar me Ismail Qemalin.
Plaku i Vlorës e priti dhe e përcolli me ndere të mëdha. Një i ri, sekretar i qeverisë së re që nuk e njihte Dedën, pyeti Ismail Qemalin:
- Pse ia bëtë gjithë këto ndere këtij malësori?
Plaku u përgjigj:
- Dedë Gjo Luli është pushkë e ngritur për mbrojtjen e Shqipërisë.
Nga jeta e Dedë Gjo Lulit
1860-1915
Ti, zotni, mund të shesësh kopshtin tënd!
Kur Shkodra më 1913 mbeti nën administrimin e komisionit ndërkombëtar, në një mbledhje të organizuar në Saraj të Shkodrës, admirali anglez Sesil i tha Dedës:
- Hoti dhe Gruda janë mbaruar, duhet të qëndrojnë jashtë kufijve të rinj të Shqipërisë.
Deda u përgjigj si me shpatë:
- Ti, zotni, mund të shesësh kopshtin tënd. Se atë tonin ne as e shesim as e falim, por e mbrojmë me gjak.
Shqiptari nuk vështron eshtrat, por zemrat…
Krali i Malit të Zi që deshte të bindë Dedë Gjo Lulin të lejonte ushtrinë e vet të hynte në Shqipëri i tha një ditë:
- Or Dedë, malësorët e tu janë vetëm një grusht eshtrash përpara taboreve të Turqisë. Pranoni ndihmën tonë që të shpëtoni.
Deda ia priti:
- Shqiptari nuk ka parë tek vetja kurrë eshtrat, por zemrën.
"Ne kemi vetëm një flamur"
Në gushtin e vitit 1910, Dedë Gjo Luli me luftëtarët e vet u ndesh me kral Nikollën në fshatin Vrellë.
- Unë kam miq të mëdhenj, si Rusinë, dhe flamurin tim e njeh gjithë bota - u tha Krali. - Futuni nën hijen e flamurit tim dhe t'i biem së bashku osmanllisë.
- Ta dish mirë o kral Nikolla, se shqiptari nuk ka luftue e derdhur gjak për të ndrrue flamurin e Sulltanit me atë të Malit të Zi, por për të pasë në krye flamurin e Skënderbeut. Pa ty e kemi filluar luftën e pa ty do ta mbarojmë. Ne kemi vetëm një flamur: tonin.
Shpinën e keni të sigurt
Kur plasi kryengritja në Malësi të Madhe në vitin 1911, kral Nikolla i Malit të Zi i dërgoi Ded Gjo Lulit këtë lajm:
- Bini osmanllisë pa frikë, se pas shpinës suaj më keni mua!
Ded Gjo Luli, që ia njihte pabesinë kralit malazes, mblodhi bashkëluftëtarët në kuvend dhe u tha:
- Burra, ta ndajmë ushtrinë dysh. Një pjesë kundër Shefqet Durgut Pashës e tjetrën kundër kralit!
- Pse, a do me hy në luftë me ne krali, a?
- Jo, por kur thotë ai se më ke pas shpine, ai nuk të ruan por të ngul thikën!
Një gazetar i huaj e pyeti Ded Gjo Lulin:
- Si është e mundur që një grusht luftëtarësh si ju të ndeshen me Portën e Lartë?
Trimi i maleve u përgjigj me pak fjalë:
- Shqiptari është ah, nuk është shelg që të përkulet.
Ded Gjo Luli kërkonte një flamur të madh me një shqiponjë të qëndisur në mes:
- O Ded, - i thanë shokët e çetës, - kemi nevoja të tjera më të mëdha.
- Jo, bre burra, - ua priti Deda, - në krye duhet flamuri se ai i ka të tana brenda: besën, zakonet, doket, trimërinë, bashkimin, luftën dhe fitoren. Ai ka gjakun e të parëve tanë që skuq e na prin!
Bajram Curri
Nuk i takon mysafirit të thëresë të zotin e shtëpisë
I dërguari i kryeministrit serb Pashiq erdhi fshehurazi në Shqipëri dhe arriti të bëjë një takim me Bajram Currin, që luftonte maleve. Ai, në emër të Pashiqit, i ofroi para, rrogë të madhe e poste të larta në Serbi, me kusht që të kthehej në Gjakovë e të mos e kundërshtonte pushtimin serb.
Bajram Curri iu përgjigj:
- Thuaji Pashiqit tënd se nuk ka aq para gjithë mbretëria e kralit të Serbisë sa për të blerë Bajram Currin. Dhe lidhur me kthimin në Gjakovë, thuaji se nuk i takon mysafirit të thërresë të zotin e shtëpisë. Atje do të kthehem vetë, se është vendi im.
Sami Frashëri
Kur e pyetën rilindasin dhe patriotin Sami Frashëri se si mund ta flakin tej zgjedhën turke shqiptarët, ai tha:
"Turqia me dashuri e me mirësi s'jep gjë kurrë. Prandaj edhe shqiptarëve… me hir s'u ka për të dhënë gjë. Shqiptarët duhet t'ua marrin turqve me pahir ato që duan".
E drejta dhe fuqia
Kur shkroi veprën e tij "Shqipëria ç'ka qënë, ç'është e ç'do të bëhet", e pyetën Sami Frashërin:
- A do të jenë të zotët shqiptarët ta mbajnë e ta ruajnë veten?
- Sigurisht - u përgjigj ai. - Dy gjëra duhen në këtë jetë për të ruajtur e mbajtur me nder atë që të takon: e drejta dhe fuqia. Dhe këto populli shqiptar i ka.
Me hir e me pahir
Duke iu përgjigjur pyetjeve të disa gazetarëve të huaj në Stamboll nëse qeveria osmane do t'ia jepte Shqipërisë reformat e premtuara, Sami Frashëri u tha:
"Porta e Lartë me dashuri e me mirësi nuk të jep gjë kurrë. Ajo e do më mirë humbjen e Shqipërisë e ta ndajë në mes armiqve që na rrethojnë, sesa t'ua lërë shqiptarëve ta ndreqin e ta lulëzojnë.
Prandaj meqë sulltani me hir s'ka për të na dhënë gjë, shqiptarët duhet t'ia marrin atij me pahir. Ta kërkojmë me fjalë, por gjithmonë duke mbajtur në dorë pushkën plot".
Armiqtë do ta kenë të vështirë të harrojnë
Kur e pyetën Sami Frashërin në vitin 1899 përse u jepte kaq rëndësi alfabetit të gjuhës shqipe, librave dhe përhapjes së tyre, kur kjo gjë mund t'u sillte rreziqe të mëdha nga ana e qeverisë osmane, ai u përgjigj:
- U jap rëndësi sepse nuk mund të ketë Shqipëri pa shqiptarë, nuk mund të ketë shqiptarë pa gjuhë shqipe, pa shkronja shqipe e shkolla në të cilat të mësohet shqipja. Kur t'i kemi të gjitha këto, armiqtë do ta kenë të vështirë të harrojnë se populli shqiptar është zot i këtij vendi.
Çerçiz Topulli
Edhe kjo është tokë shqiptare
Në gushtin e vitit 1915, të kapur pabesisht, Çerçiz Topulli dhe Muço Qulli u vunë para togës së pushkatimit të gjeneralit malazez Veshoviç, në fushën e Shtoit në Shkodër.
Para se breshëria e armëve t’i rrëzonte të dy në të njëjtin varr, oficeri malazez i tha Çerçiz Topullit:
- A e shikon se ku po e lini kokën? Në dhé të huaj, në vend që të rrini rehat aty, në vendin tuaj.
Dhe Çerçizi ia priti:
- Ne nuk kemi luftuar për shtëpinë tonë, por për vendin tonë dhe vendi jonë është gjithkund ku flitet gjuha shqipe e jetojnë shqiptarë në trojet e veta. Edhe kjo është tokë shqiptare!
Saturday, May 31, 2008
KOSOVA ISSUE
KOSOVA ISSUE
The parallels between the Islamic Extremists of Al-Qaeda and the Serbian Fashist Orthodox Chetniks, is apparent including the fact that both groups share the same sinister apologists. Islamic Extremists and Serbian Orthodox Extremists (Chetniks) are two sides of the same coin.
Is not a surprise to see that another piece of the jigsaw puzzle has slotted into place, and that right-wing anti-Muslim bigots are beginning to view the West’s dangerous and aggressive enemy, the Russian tyrant Vladimir Putin, as a desired ally in their crusade against the Muslim peoples of the world.
The division of the world, between states that have recognized, and states that are not recognising Kosova’s independence is very largely a division between the majority of democratic countries on the one hand, and those that either themselves fear ’separatist’ threats to their own territorial integrity, or that are politically hostile to the West. Russia falls into the second camp. Having itself promoted the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, and of Transnistria from Moldova, Russia cannot seriously be described as ‘fearing separatism’. Russian President Vladimir Putin has deliberately manufactured an international crisis over the Kosova issue with the express intention of disrupting the expansion of the EU and NATO and of splitting the ranks of their existing members.
This has been openly stated by Moscow’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, who has threatened force in the event that the EU adopts a common policy over Kosova: “If the EU works out a single position or if NATO steps beyond its mandate in Kosovo, these organizations will be in conflict with the U.N., and then I think we will also begin operating under the assumption that in order to be respected, one needs to use force."
Russian nationalists are selective in their presentation of Russia as the aggrieved party, righteously upholding international law - an area in which Russia’s record is less than immaculate. The Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states and Japan’s Kurile Islands during and after World War, and subsequently invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan - all without the sanction of the UN Security Council. The current Russian president describes the collapse of the Soviet Union as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe’ of the twentieth century, and has refused to apologise for the Soviet Union’s illegal annexation of the Baltic states - an annexation that the US never recognised - claiming that the act had been consensual.
Russia has refused also to return Japan’s Kuril Islands. The entire Japanese civilian population of roughly 17,000 was expelled until 1946.
Other Putinist actions that have been less than fanatical in their respect for international law include Russia’s launching of a cyber-war to destabilise Estonia, because the Estonians decided to move a statue from one place to another; the murder of Alexander Litvinenko; and the maintenance of a military presence in Moldova’s and Georgia’s break-away territories of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in violation of the sovereignty of two UN member-states, Moldova and Georgia. Indeed, Putin’s support for these break-away territories, which are much closer to Russia than is Kosova, suggest that Russia, as well as being less than consistent in its support for international law, is less than consistent in its opposition to unilateral ’separatism’.
Russia’s conflict with the Western alliance over Kosova is, in other words, a crisis that Putin unnecessarily manufactured for his own purpose, which is to split the EU, disrupt its expansion and cause problems for the US and Britain. This is not a conflict that can be attributed to aggressiveness on the West’s part!
Western leaders have bent over backwards to accommodate Putin since he took power in 1999. Tony Blair very publicly supported Putin’s murderous war to crush Chechnya. Putin responded to Western benevolence by supplying Saddam Hussein’s regime with military information in the run-up to the Iraq War.
Russia’s President Putin has warned that recognising Kosovo will rebound very badly upon the countries who have blundered into endorsing it. In other words, Serbia can burn down US embassies, Russia can give military information to Saddam to help him kill American soldiers, they can drive a wedge into the Western alliance, and they will still be Western ally against people who wave the American flag in gratitude?? Never mind that the Kosovars and Albanians are about the most pro-American nation on the planet!!
Albania has sent troops to Iraq and has shown much greater loyalty and staying power as USA ally there than many predominantly Christian states. Albanian Defence Minister has said that Albanian troops will remain in Iraq as long as US forces remain there.
The chorus of voices raised internationally against Kosova’s independence is a chorus of demagogues, despots and xenophobes ! Opposition has come from those whose experience of democracy is more recent and which themselves have nationalistic reasons for opposing recognition!
Spain and Greece were dictatorships as recently as the mid-1970s;
Slovakia and Romania as recently as 1989.
Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus all have strong recent histories of xenophobic bigotry and intolerance.
Western credibility was already slightly dented by the Serb attack on Kosova’s border crossings with Serbia, against which sufficient precautions were not taken. Northern Kosova, with its artificial Serb majority manufactured by ethnic cleansing, has long been an unhealed sore, and is an area where Serb obstructionists can cause problems for us if we do not resolve the problem promptly.
An informally partitioned Kosova, such as exists at present, will not simply be another Cyprus - an annoying problem whose resolution can be postponed indefinitely at minor but bearable cost to Western interests.
Serbia in northern Kosova, unlike Turkey in northern Cyprus, is not ready to rest content with a quiet, de facto partition. The Serbian government “minister for Kosova”, Slobodan Samardzic, has stated openly that the attack on the border crossings was ‘in accordance with general [Serbian] government policies.’
In other words, Belgrade intends to use northern Kosova as a weapon with which to destabilise the whole of Kosova and the stability of the Western Balkans in general. Indeed, some of the Serbs who attacked the border were in all probability agents of the Serbian Interior Ministry. Belgrade will undoubtedly make life difficult for newly independent Kosova. Ultimately, however, Serbia is not strong enough to overturn the new order in Kosova.
This raises the question of what the Serbian government is hoping to achieve by engaging in a struggle it cannot possibly win? A lot of commentators in the West like to stereotype the Serbian people as irrationally and spontaneously nationalist, and their politicians and statesmen as simply expressions of this characteristic. According to such a model, the attack on the Kosova border, as well as the demonstration and rioting in Belgrade, simply reflected the rotten Serb nationalism, which reacted to the recognition of Kosova like a bull to a red rag.
A demonstration of that size does not take place spontaneously; it was the result of careful planning and organisation by the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and his supporters and allies, above all Tomislav Nikolic’s extreme-right Serbian Radical Party. Workers and schoolchildren were given the day off and bussed into Belgrade from all over the country to participate.
A demonstration that enjoyed the full logistical support of the Serbian state but still numbered only 150-200,000 is actually a fairly sorry affair. Milosevic’s regime in its prime was capable of mobilizing demonstrations several times larger, reaching up to and above one million people.
A demonstration that rapidly spawned a riot in which, not only the US embassy was attacked but also the Croatian and Bosnian embassies, McDonald’s restaurants and several shops, some of which were looted in the process. In other words, this was a demonstration of the state-organised hooligan fringe of Serbian society, to which the ordinary citizens and celebrities who attended merely added a respectable veneer.
There is a global struggle taking place against Islamic fascism, and it is one that all democrats should support. But in doing so, we find ourselves in some sense aligned with some unsavory bigots whose motivation has less to do with support for democracy!
Since democratic Western values include respect for freedom of conscience and religious toleration, such bigots clearly have no place in this kind of society! Their hate is essentially no different from the Islamofascist hatred of Jews, Christians, Atheists and other religions, and their bigotry only alienates ordinary religious people and pushes them into the arms of the extremists!
One who claims to be a messenger of God is expected to live a saintly life, must not be a sexual pervert, must not be a rapist, a highway robber, a war criminal, a mass murderer, and an ethnic cleanser ! One who claims to be a messenger of God must have a superior character and stand above the vices of the people of his time!
No, this is not an Religious war
This is the Mafias Criminals War for controlling the World and Kosova issue has prompted these bigots to reveal their true criminal faces!
The parallels between the Islamic Extremists of Al-Qaeda and the Serbian Fashist Orthodox Chetniks, is apparent including the fact that both groups share the same sinister apologists. Islamic Extremists and Serbian Orthodox Extremists (Chetniks) are two sides of the same coin.
Is not a surprise to see that another piece of the jigsaw puzzle has slotted into place, and that right-wing anti-Muslim bigots are beginning to view the West’s dangerous and aggressive enemy, the Russian tyrant Vladimir Putin, as a desired ally in their crusade against the Muslim peoples of the world.
The division of the world, between states that have recognized, and states that are not recognising Kosova’s independence is very largely a division between the majority of democratic countries on the one hand, and those that either themselves fear ’separatist’ threats to their own territorial integrity, or that are politically hostile to the West. Russia falls into the second camp. Having itself promoted the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, and of Transnistria from Moldova, Russia cannot seriously be described as ‘fearing separatism’. Russian President Vladimir Putin has deliberately manufactured an international crisis over the Kosova issue with the express intention of disrupting the expansion of the EU and NATO and of splitting the ranks of their existing members.
This has been openly stated by Moscow’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, who has threatened force in the event that the EU adopts a common policy over Kosova: “If the EU works out a single position or if NATO steps beyond its mandate in Kosovo, these organizations will be in conflict with the U.N., and then I think we will also begin operating under the assumption that in order to be respected, one needs to use force."
Russian nationalists are selective in their presentation of Russia as the aggrieved party, righteously upholding international law - an area in which Russia’s record is less than immaculate. The Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states and Japan’s Kurile Islands during and after World War, and subsequently invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan - all without the sanction of the UN Security Council. The current Russian president describes the collapse of the Soviet Union as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe’ of the twentieth century, and has refused to apologise for the Soviet Union’s illegal annexation of the Baltic states - an annexation that the US never recognised - claiming that the act had been consensual.
Russia has refused also to return Japan’s Kuril Islands. The entire Japanese civilian population of roughly 17,000 was expelled until 1946.
Other Putinist actions that have been less than fanatical in their respect for international law include Russia’s launching of a cyber-war to destabilise Estonia, because the Estonians decided to move a statue from one place to another; the murder of Alexander Litvinenko; and the maintenance of a military presence in Moldova’s and Georgia’s break-away territories of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in violation of the sovereignty of two UN member-states, Moldova and Georgia. Indeed, Putin’s support for these break-away territories, which are much closer to Russia than is Kosova, suggest that Russia, as well as being less than consistent in its support for international law, is less than consistent in its opposition to unilateral ’separatism’.
Russia’s conflict with the Western alliance over Kosova is, in other words, a crisis that Putin unnecessarily manufactured for his own purpose, which is to split the EU, disrupt its expansion and cause problems for the US and Britain. This is not a conflict that can be attributed to aggressiveness on the West’s part!
Western leaders have bent over backwards to accommodate Putin since he took power in 1999. Tony Blair very publicly supported Putin’s murderous war to crush Chechnya. Putin responded to Western benevolence by supplying Saddam Hussein’s regime with military information in the run-up to the Iraq War.
Russia’s President Putin has warned that recognising Kosovo will rebound very badly upon the countries who have blundered into endorsing it. In other words, Serbia can burn down US embassies, Russia can give military information to Saddam to help him kill American soldiers, they can drive a wedge into the Western alliance, and they will still be Western ally against people who wave the American flag in gratitude?? Never mind that the Kosovars and Albanians are about the most pro-American nation on the planet!!
Albania has sent troops to Iraq and has shown much greater loyalty and staying power as USA ally there than many predominantly Christian states. Albanian Defence Minister has said that Albanian troops will remain in Iraq as long as US forces remain there.
The chorus of voices raised internationally against Kosova’s independence is a chorus of demagogues, despots and xenophobes ! Opposition has come from those whose experience of democracy is more recent and which themselves have nationalistic reasons for opposing recognition!
Spain and Greece were dictatorships as recently as the mid-1970s;
Slovakia and Romania as recently as 1989.
Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus all have strong recent histories of xenophobic bigotry and intolerance.
Western credibility was already slightly dented by the Serb attack on Kosova’s border crossings with Serbia, against which sufficient precautions were not taken. Northern Kosova, with its artificial Serb majority manufactured by ethnic cleansing, has long been an unhealed sore, and is an area where Serb obstructionists can cause problems for us if we do not resolve the problem promptly.
An informally partitioned Kosova, such as exists at present, will not simply be another Cyprus - an annoying problem whose resolution can be postponed indefinitely at minor but bearable cost to Western interests.
Serbia in northern Kosova, unlike Turkey in northern Cyprus, is not ready to rest content with a quiet, de facto partition. The Serbian government “minister for Kosova”, Slobodan Samardzic, has stated openly that the attack on the border crossings was ‘in accordance with general [Serbian] government policies.’
In other words, Belgrade intends to use northern Kosova as a weapon with which to destabilise the whole of Kosova and the stability of the Western Balkans in general. Indeed, some of the Serbs who attacked the border were in all probability agents of the Serbian Interior Ministry. Belgrade will undoubtedly make life difficult for newly independent Kosova. Ultimately, however, Serbia is not strong enough to overturn the new order in Kosova.
This raises the question of what the Serbian government is hoping to achieve by engaging in a struggle it cannot possibly win? A lot of commentators in the West like to stereotype the Serbian people as irrationally and spontaneously nationalist, and their politicians and statesmen as simply expressions of this characteristic. According to such a model, the attack on the Kosova border, as well as the demonstration and rioting in Belgrade, simply reflected the rotten Serb nationalism, which reacted to the recognition of Kosova like a bull to a red rag.
A demonstration of that size does not take place spontaneously; it was the result of careful planning and organisation by the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and his supporters and allies, above all Tomislav Nikolic’s extreme-right Serbian Radical Party. Workers and schoolchildren were given the day off and bussed into Belgrade from all over the country to participate.
A demonstration that enjoyed the full logistical support of the Serbian state but still numbered only 150-200,000 is actually a fairly sorry affair. Milosevic’s regime in its prime was capable of mobilizing demonstrations several times larger, reaching up to and above one million people.
A demonstration that rapidly spawned a riot in which, not only the US embassy was attacked but also the Croatian and Bosnian embassies, McDonald’s restaurants and several shops, some of which were looted in the process. In other words, this was a demonstration of the state-organised hooligan fringe of Serbian society, to which the ordinary citizens and celebrities who attended merely added a respectable veneer.
There is a global struggle taking place against Islamic fascism, and it is one that all democrats should support. But in doing so, we find ourselves in some sense aligned with some unsavory bigots whose motivation has less to do with support for democracy!
Since democratic Western values include respect for freedom of conscience and religious toleration, such bigots clearly have no place in this kind of society! Their hate is essentially no different from the Islamofascist hatred of Jews, Christians, Atheists and other religions, and their bigotry only alienates ordinary religious people and pushes them into the arms of the extremists!
One who claims to be a messenger of God is expected to live a saintly life, must not be a sexual pervert, must not be a rapist, a highway robber, a war criminal, a mass murderer, and an ethnic cleanser ! One who claims to be a messenger of God must have a superior character and stand above the vices of the people of his time!
No, this is not an Religious war
This is the Mafias Criminals War for controlling the World and Kosova issue has prompted these bigots to reveal their true criminal faces!
Ancient Illyria: An Archaeological Exploration
Ancient Illyria: An Archaeological Exploration
Synopsis
Illyria is the name given to the ancient region of the Balkans on the Adriatic coast from which most historians of the Balkans believe modern Albanians descend. This illuminating work by the celebrated archaeologist, Arthur Evans, examines the lives of the ancient Illyrians and contains many penetrating insights into the region. Drawing on his extensive travels in the area in the 1880s, Ancient Illyria presents for the first time Evans' original analysis of the diverse archaeological sites of the region to construct a full and fascinating history. Never before published as a single volume, this classic work is still the best account and contains the most detailed research into the subject. Fully illustrated and including pictures of some Roman inscriptions which were later destroyed during the Serbian occupation of Kosovo, this invaluable guide to the archaeology and history of ancient Illyria is an essential text for all historians and everyone interested in the Balkans.
Product details
* Hardcover: 256 pages
* Publisher: I B Tauris & Co Ltd (25 Aug 2006)
* Language English
* ISBN: 1845111672
* Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 9.2 inches
Purchase from Amazon: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ancient-Illyria-Archaeological-Arthur-Evans/dp/1845111672/sr=11-1/qid=1165781528/ref=sr_11_1/202-3081639-0469428
Synopsis
Illyria is the name given to the ancient region of the Balkans on the Adriatic coast from which most historians of the Balkans believe modern Albanians descend. This illuminating work by the celebrated archaeologist, Arthur Evans, examines the lives of the ancient Illyrians and contains many penetrating insights into the region. Drawing on his extensive travels in the area in the 1880s, Ancient Illyria presents for the first time Evans' original analysis of the diverse archaeological sites of the region to construct a full and fascinating history. Never before published as a single volume, this classic work is still the best account and contains the most detailed research into the subject. Fully illustrated and including pictures of some Roman inscriptions which were later destroyed during the Serbian occupation of Kosovo, this invaluable guide to the archaeology and history of ancient Illyria is an essential text for all historians and everyone interested in the Balkans.
Product details
* Hardcover: 256 pages
* Publisher: I B Tauris & Co Ltd (25 Aug 2006)
* Language English
* ISBN: 1845111672
* Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 9.2 inches
Purchase from Amazon: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ancient-Illyria-Archaeological-Arthur-Evans/dp/1845111672/sr=11-1/qid=1165781528/ref=sr_11_1/202-3081639-0469428
"Kosovo. A Short History" by Noel Malcolm
Albania in the Twentieth Century
A great collection and a must have. This collection should be in every Albanian home and for those who are interested to learn more about the Albanian history. Covering important events and personalities during the period 1908-1999 makes this book one of a kind.
Albania in the Twentieth Century, A History: Volume I: Albania and King Zog, 1908-39
Review: "This is an extraordinary achievement. Owen Pearson has produced a chronicle of modern Albanian history which will be an indispensable reference work for anyone working in this field. This book is a veritable treasury."--Noel Malcolm, All Soul's College, Oxford
Book Description
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History represents an unparalleled achievement in scholarship on Albania. Owen Pearson presents a complete account of the twentieth century in Albania, from its breakaway from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 to the Kosova War in 1999. In fascinating detail, Pearson chronicles the monarchy of King Zog and the wartime period where Albania became a battleground for the Greek, Italian and German armies. He describes Enver Hoxha's seizure of power, the country's fraught relationship with the post-Stalin Soviet Union and Maoist China's fraternal embrace of Albania, all leading to near-total isolationism and inevitable economic collapse. Pearson concludes with the genocide of Kosovar Albanians at the hands of the Serbian regime of Milosevic that characterised the last decade of twentieth century Albania. Comprising original research, and excerpts from rare Albanian sources, this is a compendium of primary source material that provides a year-by-year and sometimes day-by-day account of Albania's modern history. It is an essential reference for all those interested in Albanian Balkan and Eastern European history. I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies.
Albania in the Twentieth Century, A History: Volume II: Albania in Occupation and War, 1939-45
Review
"This is an extraordinary achievement. Owen Pearson has produced a chronicle of modern Albanian history which will be an indispensable reference work for anyone working in this field. This book is a veritable treasury."--Noel Malcolm, All Soul's College, Oxford
"A remarkable modern history...the richness of detail is superb. Pearson's book is a substantial personal achievement that deserves to be at the elbow of everyone interested in the field."--Literary Review, August 2006
Book Description
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History represents an unparalleled achievement in scholarship on Albania. Owen Pearson presents a complete account of the twentieth century in Albania, from its breakaway from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 to the Kosova War in 1999. Comprising original research, and excerpts from rare Albanian sources, this is a compendium of primary source material that provides a year-by-year and sometimes day-by-day account of Albania's modern history. It is an essential reference for all those interested in Albanian Balkan and Eastern European history.I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies.
Albania in the Twentieth Century, A History: Volume III: Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy, 1945-99
Review
"This is an extraordinary achievement. Owen Pearson has produced a chronicle of modern Albanian history which will be an indispensable reference work for anyone working in this field. This book is a veritable treasury."--Noel Malcolm, All Soul's College, Oxford
Book Description
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History represents an unparalleled achievement in scholarship on Albania. Owen Pearson presents a complete account of the twentieth century in Albania, from its breakaway from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 to the Kosova War in 1999. In fascinating detail, Pearson chronicles the monarchy of King Zog and the wartime period where Albania became a battleground for the Greek, Italian and German armies. He describes Enver Hoxha's seizure of power, the country's fraught relationship with the post-Stalin Soviet Union and Maoist China's fraternal embrace of Albania, all leading to near-total isolationism and inevitable economic collapse. Pearson concludes with the genocide of Kosovar Albanians at the hands of the Serbian regime of Milosevic that characterised the last decade of twentieth century Albania. Comprising original research, and excerpts from rare Albanian sources, this is a compendium of primary source material that provides a year-by-year and sometimes day-by-day account of Albania's modern history. It is an essential reference for all those interested in Albanian Balkan and Eastern European history.I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies. I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies.
Albania in the Twentieth Century, A History: Volume I: Albania and King Zog, 1908-39
Review: "This is an extraordinary achievement. Owen Pearson has produced a chronicle of modern Albanian history which will be an indispensable reference work for anyone working in this field. This book is a veritable treasury."--Noel Malcolm, All Soul's College, Oxford
Book Description
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History represents an unparalleled achievement in scholarship on Albania. Owen Pearson presents a complete account of the twentieth century in Albania, from its breakaway from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 to the Kosova War in 1999. In fascinating detail, Pearson chronicles the monarchy of King Zog and the wartime period where Albania became a battleground for the Greek, Italian and German armies. He describes Enver Hoxha's seizure of power, the country's fraught relationship with the post-Stalin Soviet Union and Maoist China's fraternal embrace of Albania, all leading to near-total isolationism and inevitable economic collapse. Pearson concludes with the genocide of Kosovar Albanians at the hands of the Serbian regime of Milosevic that characterised the last decade of twentieth century Albania. Comprising original research, and excerpts from rare Albanian sources, this is a compendium of primary source material that provides a year-by-year and sometimes day-by-day account of Albania's modern history. It is an essential reference for all those interested in Albanian Balkan and Eastern European history. I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies.
Albania in the Twentieth Century, A History: Volume II: Albania in Occupation and War, 1939-45
Review
"This is an extraordinary achievement. Owen Pearson has produced a chronicle of modern Albanian history which will be an indispensable reference work for anyone working in this field. This book is a veritable treasury."--Noel Malcolm, All Soul's College, Oxford
"A remarkable modern history...the richness of detail is superb. Pearson's book is a substantial personal achievement that deserves to be at the elbow of everyone interested in the field."--Literary Review, August 2006
Book Description
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History represents an unparalleled achievement in scholarship on Albania. Owen Pearson presents a complete account of the twentieth century in Albania, from its breakaway from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 to the Kosova War in 1999. Comprising original research, and excerpts from rare Albanian sources, this is a compendium of primary source material that provides a year-by-year and sometimes day-by-day account of Albania's modern history. It is an essential reference for all those interested in Albanian Balkan and Eastern European history.I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies.
Albania in the Twentieth Century, A History: Volume III: Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy, 1945-99
Review
"This is an extraordinary achievement. Owen Pearson has produced a chronicle of modern Albanian history which will be an indispensable reference work for anyone working in this field. This book is a veritable treasury."--Noel Malcolm, All Soul's College, Oxford
Book Description
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History represents an unparalleled achievement in scholarship on Albania. Owen Pearson presents a complete account of the twentieth century in Albania, from its breakaway from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 to the Kosova War in 1999. In fascinating detail, Pearson chronicles the monarchy of King Zog and the wartime period where Albania became a battleground for the Greek, Italian and German armies. He describes Enver Hoxha's seizure of power, the country's fraught relationship with the post-Stalin Soviet Union and Maoist China's fraternal embrace of Albania, all leading to near-total isolationism and inevitable economic collapse. Pearson concludes with the genocide of Kosovar Albanians at the hands of the Serbian regime of Milosevic that characterised the last decade of twentieth century Albania. Comprising original research, and excerpts from rare Albanian sources, this is a compendium of primary source material that provides a year-by-year and sometimes day-by-day account of Albania's modern history. It is an essential reference for all those interested in Albanian Balkan and Eastern European history.I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies. I.B.Tauris in association with the Center for Albanian Studies.
Idriz Seferi
Idriz Seferi (1847 - 1927)
Atdhetar i dalluar, udhëheqës ushtarak popullor i Lëvizjes Kombëtare. Lindi në fshatin Sefer të krahinës së Karadakut në Shkup në një familje me tradita patriotike. Qysh në moshë të re mori pjesë në qëndresën popullore kundër shtypjes ekonomike e kombëtare që sollën reformat e Tanzimatit. Më 1875 u burgos nga autoritetet osmane.
Mori pjesë në kuvendet e në veprimet luftarake të Lidhjes Shqiptare të Prizrenit dhe të asaj të Pejës. Ishte një nga udhëheqësit kryesorë të kryengritjes së Kosovës të 1916 dhe u shqua për aftësitë luftarake, si strateg popullor në betejën e Kaçanikut, si edhe në betej at e Karadakut (Drenogllavës) e të Moraves. U dallua si një ndër udhëheqësit kryesorë edhe në Kryengritjen e përgjithshme antiosmane të 1912 në Kosovë, mori pjesë në çlirimin e Shkupit, Kumanovës, Gjilanit, Preshevës e Ferizajt.
Në tetor 1912 në krye të mijëra luftëtarëve shqiptarë luftoi kundër pushtuesve serbornëdhenj në rajonet e Bujanovcit, Gollakut, Llapit e Kumanovës, ku i shkaktoi humbje të ndjeshme armikut.
Udhëhoqi çetat kosovare në luftë kundër zgjedhës serbomadhe në, vitet 1913-1915 dhe kundër pushtuesve bullgarë në vitet 1916-1918. Vazhdoi luftën për çlirimin kombëtar të Kosovës e të viseve të tjera shqiptare në Jugosllavi deri në fund të jetës së tij.
Thenie mbi Idriz Seferi
Kush është gjenerali?
Të mahnitur nga qëndresa heroike që u bënë kryengritësit kosovarë ushtrive osmane në grykën e Kaçanikut më 1910, gazetarët e huaj po kërkonin me ngulm cili ishte ai gjeneral i famshëm që i drejtonte. Kur u gjetën përpara, udhëheqësit trim Idriz Seferi, e pyetën:
- Ti je gjenerali i kësaj qëndrese të pashembullt?
Idrizi, duke fërkuar mustaqet u përgjigj:
- Si unë, këtu janë të gjithë, sepse armën kundër armikut ua ka mësuar nëna që në djep. Të gjithë shqiptarët janë gjeneralë kur luftojnë për vendin e vet, por në vend të gradave në supe kemi armët e brezit.
Atdhetar i dalluar, udhëheqës ushtarak popullor i Lëvizjes Kombëtare. Lindi në fshatin Sefer të krahinës së Karadakut në Shkup në një familje me tradita patriotike. Qysh në moshë të re mori pjesë në qëndresën popullore kundër shtypjes ekonomike e kombëtare që sollën reformat e Tanzimatit. Më 1875 u burgos nga autoritetet osmane.
Mori pjesë në kuvendet e në veprimet luftarake të Lidhjes Shqiptare të Prizrenit dhe të asaj të Pejës. Ishte një nga udhëheqësit kryesorë të kryengritjes së Kosovës të 1916 dhe u shqua për aftësitë luftarake, si strateg popullor në betejën e Kaçanikut, si edhe në betej at e Karadakut (Drenogllavës) e të Moraves. U dallua si një ndër udhëheqësit kryesorë edhe në Kryengritjen e përgjithshme antiosmane të 1912 në Kosovë, mori pjesë në çlirimin e Shkupit, Kumanovës, Gjilanit, Preshevës e Ferizajt.
Në tetor 1912 në krye të mijëra luftëtarëve shqiptarë luftoi kundër pushtuesve serbornëdhenj në rajonet e Bujanovcit, Gollakut, Llapit e Kumanovës, ku i shkaktoi humbje të ndjeshme armikut.
Udhëhoqi çetat kosovare në luftë kundër zgjedhës serbomadhe në, vitet 1913-1915 dhe kundër pushtuesve bullgarë në vitet 1916-1918. Vazhdoi luftën për çlirimin kombëtar të Kosovës e të viseve të tjera shqiptare në Jugosllavi deri në fund të jetës së tij.
Thenie mbi Idriz Seferi
Kush është gjenerali?
Të mahnitur nga qëndresa heroike që u bënë kryengritësit kosovarë ushtrive osmane në grykën e Kaçanikut më 1910, gazetarët e huaj po kërkonin me ngulm cili ishte ai gjeneral i famshëm që i drejtonte. Kur u gjetën përpara, udhëheqësit trim Idriz Seferi, e pyetën:
- Ti je gjenerali i kësaj qëndrese të pashembullt?
Idrizi, duke fërkuar mustaqet u përgjigj:
- Si unë, këtu janë të gjithë, sepse armën kundër armikut ua ka mësuar nëna që në djep. Të gjithë shqiptarët janë gjeneralë kur luftojnë për vendin e vet, por në vend të gradave në supe kemi armët e brezit.
Sulejman Vokshi
Sulejman Vokshi (1815 - 1890)
Sulejman Vokshi është veprimtar dhe figurë e shquar e Lidhjes së Prizrenit dhe Hero i Popullit në Kosovë. Lindi në Gjakovë nga një familje me tradita kombëtare, pjesëmarrëse në kryengritjet antiosmane kundër Tanzimatit. Veprimtarinë patriotike e filloi që në moshën djaloshare. Në vitet 40të shek. XIX mori pjesë me armë kundër reformave të Tanzimatitn dhe prandaj qeveria osmane e internoi dhe e burgosi shumë herë. Lidhja Shqiptare Prizrenit e gjeti Sulejman Vokshin e përgatitur në të gjitha drejtimet si luftëtar e udhëheqës i shquar popullor dhe me koncepte të qarta politike. Ishte një nga nismëtarët e themelimit të saj dhe gjatë veprimtarisë së Lidhjes një ndër udhëheqësit kryesorë, politikë e ushtarakë, anëtar i Komitetit Qendror dhe përfaqësues konsekuent i krahut revolucionar të saj. Ai qëndroi jo vetëm në ballë të luftës për mbrojtjen e tërësisë së trojeve shqiptare, por edhe të luftës për realizimin me forcën e armëve të autonomisë së mbarë trojeve shqiptare si shkallë e parë, e kushtëzuar nga rrethanat e brendshme dhe të jashtme, e luftës për fitoren e pavarësisë së plotë.
Qeveria e përkohshme e Lidhjes shqiptare e ngarkoi me detyrën e udhëheqësit ushtarak të forcave të armatosura të ushtrisë kombëtare të saj, ishte edhe kryetar i komisionit të të ardhurave dhe financave. Ishte drejtues i Degës së Lidhjes për Gjakovën dhe një nga organizatorët e ngjarjeve të Gjakovës që shpunë në vrasjen e mareshalit osman Mehmet Ali Pashë Maxhari. Si anëtar i Shtabit ushtarak të Lidhjes, Sulejman Vokshi ishte një nga udhëheqësit e luftëtarëve shqiptarë në betejat për mbrojtjen e Plavës e Gucisë, që shpunë në shpartallimin e forcave të Malit të Zi. Me shpalljen e autonomisë dhe krijimin e Kuvernës së Përdorme, ishte krahas Abdyl Frashërit, Ymer Prizrenit e të tjerëve, në krye të kësaj me cilësinë e komandantit të forcave për mbrojtjen. Forcat e Lidhjes nën komandën e tij brenda një kohe fare të shkurtër e shtrinë pushtetin popullor administrativ e ushtarak të Lidhjes në Shkup, Prishtinë, Mitrovicë, Lumë, Guci, Vuçitërnë, Preshevë etj. Nën drejtimin e tij si kryetar i shtabit të forcave shqiptare dhe me pjesëmarrjen e tij direkte u zhvillua edhe lufta heroike për mbrojtjen e Lidhjes në Shtimje e Slivovë kundër forcave osmane të Dervish Pashës. E vazhdoi qëndresën kundër pushtuesit osman edhe pas thyerjes së Lidhjes shqiptare dhe shpërndarjes së qeverisë së saj deri më 1885, madje ai organizoi në këtë vit një kryengritje tjetër kundër pushtuesve që shpërtheu në Kosovë. U kap me pabesi. Pushteti osman e konsideroi si një nga udhëheqësit më të rrezikshëm të Lidhjes, prandaj gjykata e jashtëzakonshme e Prizrenit e dënoi me vdekje. Por para presionit të Lëvizjes Kombëtare Shqiptare u detyrua ta lirojë pas burgimit. Sulejman Vokshi radhitet ndër udhëheqësit e luftëtarët konsekuentë të popullit shqiptar në luftën për realizimin e sigurimin e unitetit të tij kombëtar e shtetëror. Figura e tij u përjetësua edhe nga këngët popullore historike të asaj periudhe. Vdiq në Gjakovë.
Sulejman Vokshi është veprimtar dhe figurë e shquar e Lidhjes së Prizrenit dhe Hero i Popullit në Kosovë. Lindi në Gjakovë nga një familje me tradita kombëtare, pjesëmarrëse në kryengritjet antiosmane kundër Tanzimatit. Veprimtarinë patriotike e filloi që në moshën djaloshare. Në vitet 40të shek. XIX mori pjesë me armë kundër reformave të Tanzimatitn dhe prandaj qeveria osmane e internoi dhe e burgosi shumë herë. Lidhja Shqiptare Prizrenit e gjeti Sulejman Vokshin e përgatitur në të gjitha drejtimet si luftëtar e udhëheqës i shquar popullor dhe me koncepte të qarta politike. Ishte një nga nismëtarët e themelimit të saj dhe gjatë veprimtarisë së Lidhjes një ndër udhëheqësit kryesorë, politikë e ushtarakë, anëtar i Komitetit Qendror dhe përfaqësues konsekuent i krahut revolucionar të saj. Ai qëndroi jo vetëm në ballë të luftës për mbrojtjen e tërësisë së trojeve shqiptare, por edhe të luftës për realizimin me forcën e armëve të autonomisë së mbarë trojeve shqiptare si shkallë e parë, e kushtëzuar nga rrethanat e brendshme dhe të jashtme, e luftës për fitoren e pavarësisë së plotë.
Qeveria e përkohshme e Lidhjes shqiptare e ngarkoi me detyrën e udhëheqësit ushtarak të forcave të armatosura të ushtrisë kombëtare të saj, ishte edhe kryetar i komisionit të të ardhurave dhe financave. Ishte drejtues i Degës së Lidhjes për Gjakovën dhe një nga organizatorët e ngjarjeve të Gjakovës që shpunë në vrasjen e mareshalit osman Mehmet Ali Pashë Maxhari. Si anëtar i Shtabit ushtarak të Lidhjes, Sulejman Vokshi ishte një nga udhëheqësit e luftëtarëve shqiptarë në betejat për mbrojtjen e Plavës e Gucisë, që shpunë në shpartallimin e forcave të Malit të Zi. Me shpalljen e autonomisë dhe krijimin e Kuvernës së Përdorme, ishte krahas Abdyl Frashërit, Ymer Prizrenit e të tjerëve, në krye të kësaj me cilësinë e komandantit të forcave për mbrojtjen. Forcat e Lidhjes nën komandën e tij brenda një kohe fare të shkurtër e shtrinë pushtetin popullor administrativ e ushtarak të Lidhjes në Shkup, Prishtinë, Mitrovicë, Lumë, Guci, Vuçitërnë, Preshevë etj. Nën drejtimin e tij si kryetar i shtabit të forcave shqiptare dhe me pjesëmarrjen e tij direkte u zhvillua edhe lufta heroike për mbrojtjen e Lidhjes në Shtimje e Slivovë kundër forcave osmane të Dervish Pashës. E vazhdoi qëndresën kundër pushtuesit osman edhe pas thyerjes së Lidhjes shqiptare dhe shpërndarjes së qeverisë së saj deri më 1885, madje ai organizoi në këtë vit një kryengritje tjetër kundër pushtuesve që shpërtheu në Kosovë. U kap me pabesi. Pushteti osman e konsideroi si një nga udhëheqësit më të rrezikshëm të Lidhjes, prandaj gjykata e jashtëzakonshme e Prizrenit e dënoi me vdekje. Por para presionit të Lëvizjes Kombëtare Shqiptare u detyrua ta lirojë pas burgimit. Sulejman Vokshi radhitet ndër udhëheqësit e luftëtarët konsekuentë të popullit shqiptar në luftën për realizimin e sigurimin e unitetit të tij kombëtar e shtetëror. Figura e tij u përjetësua edhe nga këngët popullore historike të asaj periudhe. Vdiq në Gjakovë.
Ahmet Delia
Ahmet Delia (1850-1912)
He was a chieftain in Drenica (as most defenders of Kosova from the Serbs are), from the same village as the Jashari family; Prekaz! He was active even in younger days. His father, Deli Prekazi,. was one of four representatives of Drenica in the Prizren League. Ahmet himself was early involved in fightings against occupiers, e.g. the Turks in the 1880s.
When Serbia invaded 1912, he was in his 70s. Serb soldiers came to the village to loot and kill. They started robbing Delia's neighbor.
Ahmet Delia, upon hearing the shouts, called his son Mursel Ahmet Delia (who later fought in the ceta of Azem Galica) and with axes they went towards the house of need. they were joined by another man, also in his 70s like Delia (cannot recall his name) and with axes they surprised the armed Serbs, killing them one by one. The Serb, perhaps stunned by this bravery, became as if paralyzed. Ahmet's son Mursel succeeded in killing a Serb soldier and take his arm with which he shot down five-six soldiers/bandits. Ahmet took his axe on a further trip to the second floor. There, the Serb soldier shouted 'staj, staj!!!' (halt, halt) but the brave man didn't stop, and so he was killed. He shouted his son's name who came to aid and killed the Serb. Ahmet Delia died, however, defending his fellow neighbours from the thieves, or "soldiers" if you wish.
Of the Serb band, which counted for atleast some 10 men, only one survived, a soldier called Jovan or Jovo.
He was a chieftain in Drenica (as most defenders of Kosova from the Serbs are), from the same village as the Jashari family; Prekaz! He was active even in younger days. His father, Deli Prekazi,. was one of four representatives of Drenica in the Prizren League. Ahmet himself was early involved in fightings against occupiers, e.g. the Turks in the 1880s.
When Serbia invaded 1912, he was in his 70s. Serb soldiers came to the village to loot and kill. They started robbing Delia's neighbor.
Ahmet Delia, upon hearing the shouts, called his son Mursel Ahmet Delia (who later fought in the ceta of Azem Galica) and with axes they went towards the house of need. they were joined by another man, also in his 70s like Delia (cannot recall his name) and with axes they surprised the armed Serbs, killing them one by one. The Serb, perhaps stunned by this bravery, became as if paralyzed. Ahmet's son Mursel succeeded in killing a Serb soldier and take his arm with which he shot down five-six soldiers/bandits. Ahmet took his axe on a further trip to the second floor. There, the Serb soldier shouted 'staj, staj!!!' (halt, halt) but the brave man didn't stop, and so he was killed. He shouted his son's name who came to aid and killed the Serb. Ahmet Delia died, however, defending his fellow neighbours from the thieves, or "soldiers" if you wish.
Of the Serb band, which counted for atleast some 10 men, only one survived, a soldier called Jovan or Jovo.
Bajram Curri
Bajram Curri (1862 – March 29, 1925)
Bajram Curri was an ethnic Albanian nationalist from Kosovo.
Curri was born in Gjakovë. While what is now Albania and Kosovo were under Ottoman control, Curri represented the interests of the Albanians. He successfully fought in 1912 against the Young Turks. During the First World War he started a guerrilla unit, part of the Kachak movement.
When Albania was reconstituted after the war, he held various governments posts as a Minister and as a commander in the army. As an opponent of the later King Ahmed Zogu, to whom the Kosovo issue was less important, he was pursued by the King's troops and encircled in the northern Albanian mountains. He shot himself on 29 March 1925, in order to escape capture. The place where he died, Dragobi in Tropojë District, is today called Bajram Curri, as the Albanian communists revered him as a freedom fighter and nationalist.
Bajram Curri was an ethnic Albanian nationalist from Kosovo.
Curri was born in Gjakovë. While what is now Albania and Kosovo were under Ottoman control, Curri represented the interests of the Albanians. He successfully fought in 1912 against the Young Turks. During the First World War he started a guerrilla unit, part of the Kachak movement.
When Albania was reconstituted after the war, he held various governments posts as a Minister and as a commander in the army. As an opponent of the later King Ahmed Zogu, to whom the Kosovo issue was less important, he was pursued by the King's troops and encircled in the northern Albanian mountains. He shot himself on 29 March 1925, in order to escape capture. The place where he died, Dragobi in Tropojë District, is today called Bajram Curri, as the Albanian communists revered him as a freedom fighter and nationalist.
Pjetër (Peter) Bogdani
Pjetër (Peter) Bogdani (1625-1689)
Born in Gur i Hasit near Prizren about 1630, Bogdani was educated in the traditions of the Catholic church to which he devoted all his energy. His uncle Andrea or Ndre Bogdani (ca. 1600-1683) was Archbishop of Skopje and author of a Latin-Albanian grammar, now lost. Bogdani is said to have received his initial schooling from the Franciscans at Ciprovac in northwestern Bulgaria and then studied at the Illyrian College of Loretto near Ancona, as had his predecessors Pjetër Budi and Frang Bardhi. From 1651 to 1654 he served as a parish priest in Pult and from 1654 to 1656 studied at the College of the Propaganda Fide in Rome where he graduated as a doctor of philosophy and theology. In 1656, he was named Bishop of Shkodra, a post he held for twenty-one years, and was also appointed Administrator of the Archdiocese of Antivari (Bar) until 1671. During the most troubled years of the Turkish-Austrian war, 1664-1669, he hid out in the villages of Barbullush and Rjoll near Shkodra.
After arranging for the publication of the Cuneus Prophetarum, Bogdani returned to the Balkans in March 1686 and spent the next years promoting resistance to the armies of the Ottoman Empire, in particular in Kosova. He contributed a force of 6,000 Albanian soldiers to the Austrian army which had arrived in Prishtina and accompanied it to capture Prizren. There, however, he and much of his army were met by another equally formidable adversary, the plague. Bogdani returned to Prishtina but succumbed to the disease there in December 1689. His nephew Gjergj reported in 1698 that his uncle's remains were later exhumed by Turkish and Tatar soldiers and fed to the dogs in the middle of the square in Prishtina. So ended one of the great figures of early Albanian culture, the writer often referred to as the father of Albanian prose.
The Cuneus Prophetarum was published in two parallel columns, one in Albanian and one in Italian, and is divided into two volumes, each with four sections (scala). The first volume, which is preceded by dedications and eulogies in Latin, Albanian, Serbian and Italian, and includes two eight-line poems in Albanian, one by his cousin Luca Bogdani and one by Luca Summa, deals primarily with themes from the Old Testament: i) How God created man, ii) The prophets and their metaphors concerning the coming of the Messiah, iii) The lives of the prophets and their prophecies, iv) The songs of the ten Sibyls. The second volume, entitled De vita Jesu Christi salvatoris mundi (On the life of Jesus Christ, saviour of the world), is devoted mostly to the New Testament: i) The life of Jesus Christ, ii) The miracles of Jesus Christ, iii) The suffering and death of Jesus Christ, iv) The resurrection and second coming of Christ. This section includes a translation from the Book of Daniel, 9. 24-26, in eight languages: Latin, Greek, Armenian, Syriac, Hebrew, Arabic, Italian and Albanian, and is followed by a chapter on the life of the Antichrist, by indices in Italian and Albanian and by a three-page appendix on the Antichità della Casa Bogdana (Antiquity of the House of the Bogdanis).
The Cuneus Prophetarum is considered to be the masterpiece of early Albanian literature and is the first work in Albanian of full artistic and literary quality. In scope, it covers philosophy, theology and science (with digressions on geography, astronomy, physics and history). With its poetry and literary prose, it touches on questions of aesthetic and literary theory. It is a humanist work of the Baroque Age steeped in the philosophical traditions of Plato, Aristotle, St Augustine, and St Thomas Aquinas. Bogdani's fundamental philosophical aim is a knowledge of God, an unravelling of the problem of existence, for which he strives with reason and intellect.
Mic Sokoli
Mic Sokoli (1839 - 1881)
Born in Bujanit. Under the leadership of the Prizren League he fought to prevent the dismemberment of albanian-inhabited lands and for the autonomy of Albania. Fought in Precava against Mehmet Ali Pasha of the Ottoman empire and also in Nokshiq against the Serbian aggressive force. Fought also in Plave, Hot, Grude, Tuz, Prizren, Ferizaj, Gjilan, and Shkup.
In the battle of the Slivova (April 1881) against the Ottoman forces of Dervish Pasha, Mic Sokoli committed a very rare brave act, jumped in front of a firing turkish cannon to prevent it from hitting the albanian rebels.
Born in Bujanit. Under the leadership of the Prizren League he fought to prevent the dismemberment of albanian-inhabited lands and for the autonomy of Albania. Fought in Precava against Mehmet Ali Pasha of the Ottoman empire and also in Nokshiq against the Serbian aggressive force. Fought also in Plave, Hot, Grude, Tuz, Prizren, Ferizaj, Gjilan, and Shkup.
In the battle of the Slivova (April 1881) against the Ottoman forces of Dervish Pasha, Mic Sokoli committed a very rare brave act, jumped in front of a firing turkish cannon to prevent it from hitting the albanian rebels.
Isa Boletini
Isa Boletini (1864-1916)
Isa Boletini was born in 1864 in Boletin, a small town/big village to the north of Mitrovica, in the Highlands of Shala e Bajgores. His family was patriotic, and at the age of seventeen, Isa Boletini joined the Albanian Prizren League which aimed at defending Albanian territories against Serbs, Montenegrins & Turks. He participated as a teenager in the battle of Slivovë, in 1881. After this, he pursued the patriotic duties by fighting for the autonomy of our territories from the high Porte. He was therefore deported to Istanbul, from where he returned to Kosova in 1906.
He was a true patriot but also chivalric and with a good sense of honor/justice. Thus, when a couple of robbers harassed the Serbs who lived in Boletin, he and his men searched them up and punished them, returning the stolen property to their Serb neighbours. But this didn't mean he was ready to accept serfdom and Serbian occupation. When the Serbs invaded Kosova in 1912, he was one of the prominent patriots to lead the resistance. It became, however, obvious that the 20-30,000 poorly armed Albanians, despite valiant resistance (for instance, in Merdare, within just a couple of days, they killed around 1,500 Serbs) they could not resist with victory against the over 300,000 strong Serb troops, armed with better weapons.
Isa Boletini travelled to Vlora, South Albania, where he served as Kosova's delegate in the declaration of independence of Albania 1912, November 28th. His precious Kosova was, however, annexed by Serbia, but he continued fighting with weapons as well as diplomacy (travelling together with Ismail Qemali to Vienna, Lodnon etc) for the liberation of Kosova and its union with the Albanian state. In 1916, he was to be found in Montenegro which als had occupied Albanian territories (such as Ulqin/Ulcinj, Plava & Gucia/Gusinje, Highlands around Hoti & Gruda) and this great patriot's presence made them feel threatened.
At the bridge of Ribnitza (Ribnica) the Montenegrins set up a trap for him and his closest warriors when they were leaving Cetinje. The Montenegrins were led by a certain Radomir Vesovic and outnumbered Isa and his men. Radomir shouted "Predajte ozuzje" (Give up your arms) ... but in Albanian traditions back then, surrending your arms without a fight (the Spartan saying 'molon lave' is a good parallel) was dishonorable, thus Isa Boletini answered
"O Veshoviq, a din me kand po flet? Jam isa Boletinin s'iu dorezoj armet as mbretit as karlit,
jo ma ty, se i kam armet si atin dhe birin"
(Vesovic, do you know who you're talking to? I am isa Boletini, I will not surrender arms to kings let alone you,
since they are like my father and son). The confrontation was inevitable.
The first to trigger the gun was Pero Buric, of the Vasovici clan. Isa's men answered immediately, as did Isa. Jonuz Boletini, Isa's nephew, having two guns started emptying them on the Montenegrins, and despite beeing hit several times, he continued fighting even as he lied dying, until hus bullets were finished. Halil Boletini, Isa's son, besides shooting with guns also threw a bomb he had received from a certain Niko. Isa's other son Sejdi, after killing the Montenegrin who stood infront of him, took the dead one's gun and emptied it on the Montenegrins until he died. Niman Misini, although having no gun of his own, did not run, but stood by Isa and fell heroically as well. The dead martyrs were;
Isa Boletini - 51 years old
Halil Boletini - 24 years old, Isa's son
Seidi Boletini - 18 years old, Isa's son a student in Vienna
Jonuz Boletini - 26 years old, Isa's nephew
Halit Boletini - 24 years old, Isa's nephew
Hajdar Selim Radisheva - 30 years old, from Drenica, married to Isa's daughter.
Idris Bislimi - Hajdar's nephew, 18 years old
Misin Niman Bala - from Isniq, Isa's cousin, shaljân.
Of the Montenegrins, some 7-8 were killed and some 12 were wounded.
Isa Boletini was killed by Montenegrin forces on January 23rd, 1916, in an abortive attempt to capture the Montenegrin capital of Podgorica in the wake of an Austro-Hungarian military advance.
Isa Boletini bound his and his family’s life with the destiny of his fatherland, for which his love and loyalty are remembered with his words: “I am well when Albania is well” (“Unë jam mirë kur asht mirë Shqipnia”). He was noted for always wearing the traditional Albanian white cap (plis) and national dress.
In 2004, Ibrahim Rugova, president of Kosovo awarded him the highest order “Hero of Kosovo” along with Adem Jashari, Hasan Prishtina, and Bajram Curri.
Isa Boletini's heroic deeds and heroic death made his name immortal, cheerished in ballads.
Azem Galica
Azem Galica (1889-1924)
Azem Bejta, more commonly known as Azem Galica, was born in the village of Galica (medieval Kalica) in Drenica. He was the son of Bejta Galica, a patriot who died fighting for Albania's liberation from the Turkish yoke. His son, Azem, pursued the fathjer's path and initiated his patriotic career in 1910-1912 during the fightings against the Ottomans. The same year, 1912, the Serbs invaded Kosova and Azem Galica was among the many patriots who fought against the Serbs. He prooved his valiance on many occasions. When the Serbs were defeated by the Bulgarians and Austro-Hungarians in 1915, Kosova was divided between Bulgaria and Austro-Hungary. Azem Galica did not accept this occupation either, and he became an outlaw fighting the Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian soldiers. In one occasion, for instance, it was him, his brother and two other fighters against as many as 30 Bulgarian soldiers. They killed atleast 13 and chased the others.
After Austro-Hungary's withdrawel, however, Serbia occupied Kosova again. Azem Galica and his ceta (military formation) pursued their life mission; the liberation of Kosova. Their continuous battles with Serb military and police is the source of many anecdotes of bravery and valiance. Along his side was the Jeanne D'Arc of Kosova, his wife Qerime Radisheva, or Shota (seen in the picture above, in men's clothes, along her husband). They won many pitched battles with local Serb forces, but always under the rule that "no Serbs besides those carryong weapons are to be touched ..."! He even succeeded in creating a free-zone in Kosova due to military success, a zone which was called "Arbnia e Vogel" (little Albania).. The Serbs, however, had no intention on letting this little autonomous zone survive, and thus with superior arms and more soldiers and police, they engaged Azem Galica's band of warriors. After heavy casualties, they succeeded in wounding Azem who later died from his wounds. His last wish was for his body not to be found by the Serbs, and thus he was buried in a deep cave. He died in July, 1924. His wife continued the fightings for some while.
Azem Galica was a legendary warrior, imoortalized in ballads attributed to him and his band of warriors.
Shote Galica (Qerime Galica)(1895 - 1927)
Luftëtare e shquar e çetave kryengritëse kosovare për çlirimin dhe bashkimin kombëtar të të gjitha viseve shqiptare dhe për një regjim shtetëror demokratik në Shqipëri, Heroinë e Popullit. Pa përfillur terrorin e armikut dhe ligjet e ashpra të fesë e të kanunit luftoi heroikisht për 12 vjet me radhë kundër pushtuesve serbë, austrohungarezë e bullgarë.
Shote Galica mori pjesë në më shumë se 40 aksione të rëndësishme kundër armikut. Kundërshtoi me konsekuencë politikën e dhunës e të terrorit të regjimit shovinist të Beogradit ndaj popullsisë shqiptare, shpronësimin e shpërnguljen e saj dhe kolonizimin sllav të trevave shqiptare. Më 1919 mori pjesë në Kryengritjen e Rrafshit të Dukagjinit, ndërsa më 1922-1923 luftoi për mbrojtjen e Zonës Neutrale të Junikut, e cila shërbente si bazë për kryengritjen e Kosovës e të Malësisë. Në korrik 1924 mori pjesë në mbrojtjen e zonës së lirë të Drenicës (Arbanisë së Vogël). Në korrik 1924 pas vdekjes së të shoqit Azem Galicës, vazhdoi luftimet në krye të çetës së tij. Së bashku me qindra luftëtarë të Kosovës në dhjetor të 1924 luftoi kundër ushtrive intervencioniste serbe e bjellogardiste dhe mercenarëve të Ahmet Zogut. Humbi në luftime nga masakrat e shovinistëve serbë 22 anëtarë të familjes.
Nga fundi i vitit 1926 Shote Galica u vendos në Shqipëri, ku vdiq në Fushë Krujë e braktisur nga regjimi zogist.
Azem Bejta, more commonly known as Azem Galica, was born in the village of Galica (medieval Kalica) in Drenica. He was the son of Bejta Galica, a patriot who died fighting for Albania's liberation from the Turkish yoke. His son, Azem, pursued the fathjer's path and initiated his patriotic career in 1910-1912 during the fightings against the Ottomans. The same year, 1912, the Serbs invaded Kosova and Azem Galica was among the many patriots who fought against the Serbs. He prooved his valiance on many occasions. When the Serbs were defeated by the Bulgarians and Austro-Hungarians in 1915, Kosova was divided between Bulgaria and Austro-Hungary. Azem Galica did not accept this occupation either, and he became an outlaw fighting the Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian soldiers. In one occasion, for instance, it was him, his brother and two other fighters against as many as 30 Bulgarian soldiers. They killed atleast 13 and chased the others.
After Austro-Hungary's withdrawel, however, Serbia occupied Kosova again. Azem Galica and his ceta (military formation) pursued their life mission; the liberation of Kosova. Their continuous battles with Serb military and police is the source of many anecdotes of bravery and valiance. Along his side was the Jeanne D'Arc of Kosova, his wife Qerime Radisheva, or Shota (seen in the picture above, in men's clothes, along her husband). They won many pitched battles with local Serb forces, but always under the rule that "no Serbs besides those carryong weapons are to be touched ..."! He even succeeded in creating a free-zone in Kosova due to military success, a zone which was called "Arbnia e Vogel" (little Albania).. The Serbs, however, had no intention on letting this little autonomous zone survive, and thus with superior arms and more soldiers and police, they engaged Azem Galica's band of warriors. After heavy casualties, they succeeded in wounding Azem who later died from his wounds. His last wish was for his body not to be found by the Serbs, and thus he was buried in a deep cave. He died in July, 1924. His wife continued the fightings for some while.
Azem Galica was a legendary warrior, imoortalized in ballads attributed to him and his band of warriors.
Shote Galica (Qerime Galica)(1895 - 1927)
Luftëtare e shquar e çetave kryengritëse kosovare për çlirimin dhe bashkimin kombëtar të të gjitha viseve shqiptare dhe për një regjim shtetëror demokratik në Shqipëri, Heroinë e Popullit. Pa përfillur terrorin e armikut dhe ligjet e ashpra të fesë e të kanunit luftoi heroikisht për 12 vjet me radhë kundër pushtuesve serbë, austrohungarezë e bullgarë.
Shote Galica mori pjesë në më shumë se 40 aksione të rëndësishme kundër armikut. Kundërshtoi me konsekuencë politikën e dhunës e të terrorit të regjimit shovinist të Beogradit ndaj popullsisë shqiptare, shpronësimin e shpërnguljen e saj dhe kolonizimin sllav të trevave shqiptare. Më 1919 mori pjesë në Kryengritjen e Rrafshit të Dukagjinit, ndërsa më 1922-1923 luftoi për mbrojtjen e Zonës Neutrale të Junikut, e cila shërbente si bazë për kryengritjen e Kosovës e të Malësisë. Në korrik 1924 mori pjesë në mbrojtjen e zonës së lirë të Drenicës (Arbanisë së Vogël). Në korrik 1924 pas vdekjes së të shoqit Azem Galicës, vazhdoi luftimet në krye të çetës së tij. Së bashku me qindra luftëtarë të Kosovës në dhjetor të 1924 luftoi kundër ushtrive intervencioniste serbe e bjellogardiste dhe mercenarëve të Ahmet Zogut. Humbi në luftime nga masakrat e shovinistëve serbë 22 anëtarë të familjes.
Nga fundi i vitit 1926 Shote Galica u vendos në Shqipëri, ku vdiq në Fushë Krujë e braktisur nga regjimi zogist.
The Complex Environment of Skenderbeg's Activity
The Complex Environment of Skenderbeg's Activity - articles by Stavro Skendi
During the Late Middle Ages Albania gave rise to a number of separate administrative units. Some of these, in the highlands, were tribal and were ruled by chieftains. Other units, mostly on the littoral and not far from it, underwent the feudal influences of the states of the Italian peninsula, which attempted to use Albania - only 47 miles from the coast of Italy - as a bridgehead for their expansion in the Balkans. Others, on the contrary, came under the feudal influences of the neighboring Serbian state which was stretching out toward the Adriatic and southward. Still other units, particularly in the south and more inland, had been under the influence of Byzantine feudalism.
These various brands of feudalism, however, did not remain static. When Charles I of Anjou dreamed of expanding in the Balkans, he landed in Albania and created in 1272 the "Kingdom of Albania." In the constitution he issued are mentioned "prelates, counts, barons … of Albania" who swore allegiance to the King, who received them, together with their "vassals" under his protection.[1] But the Angevine King failed in his enterprise to conquer Constantinople and, under Andronicus II (1282-1328), the Byzantines reached again the Adriatic. In parts of northern Albania Serbs of Raska spread their sway, coming into intermittent conflicts with the Angevines.[2] At the time of Stefan Dushan, the Serbs overran Albanian territory and, in their southward
march toward Epirus and Thessaly, helped the further expansion of the Albanians in Epirus, while relatives of the Serbian King became rulers in parts of Albania.[3]
These changes in political power on Albanian soil brought about also changes in the diffusion of Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. The religious split between East and West, which occurred in 1054, intensified the opposition between the Latin north and the Greek south. The Thema of Durazzo became its most active theater. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the political oscillations were accompanied by oscillations between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Both feudal lords and bishops led a religiously amphibious life.[4]
Albanian high nobility along the Adriatic was Catholic, but in the interior, toward Ochrida - even in Croya before the arrival of the Angevines - was under the domination of Greek influence.[5] When in 1319 an alliance of European Catholic rulers directed against the Serbian King, Uros II Milutin, a "schismatic," received the blessing of the pope, Albania was entangled in the net of papal politics. The heads of the important feudal families, as the Musachi and the Arianiti, were addressed in the papal bull as “dilectii filii” and “viri catholiki” they responded that "as Catholic men they will seize the opportunity to cast off the yoke of the true schismatic and enemy of the Christian faith, the perfidious King of Serbia."[6] In the north, even two zupani on the coast of Dioclea, the Albanian Catholic Vladislav Jonima (who in 1303 had lived in the court of the Serbian King),[7] and the still Orthodox Radislav, sided with the West.[8] But the Serbs thwarted their efforts and continued to hold firmly the northern part of Albania. Pressed by the Greeks to the south and still more strongly by the Serbs to the north, the Albanian feudal lords turned to the Angevines in Durazzo and Naples for protection.[9]
It will not seem strange then that the battle between the popes of Rome and those of Avignon was reflected in Albania, the former supporting the house of the Balshas in the north and the latter that of the Thopias, who called themselves “de domo Francie” [10] around Durazzo.[11]
Although Albania was the battlefield between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, the struggle there never took a violent form. Owing to shifts in domination, the Catholic and Orthodox Albanians had acquired a capacity to adapt themselves to serve masters of opposing religious creeds, especially in the cities where the population was confessionally mixed.[12] Feudal lords, on the other hand, endeavored to be on good terms with both sides. Gjon Castrioti, the father of Skenderbeg, had Catholic clergymen and abbeys in his land, but he also sent presents to the Serbian Orthodox Monastery of Chilandar on Mount Athos.[13] Religious tolerance was also strengthened because many Albanian Catholic feudal families had kinship ties with Serbian princely Orthodox families, like the Brankovici and the Crnojevici, and some even with Byzantine emperors, as the Arianiti Comnen.[14] Also the fact that the feudal lords, in general, were small and divided rendered the constitution of two compact groups opposing each other impossible, preventing thus the rise of religious fanaticism.
Following the collapse of Stefan Dushan's empire, the number of Albanian local lords increased. There were not only the old feudal families, but also small ones emerged, the so-called "signoretti" in a Venetian document of 1461.[15] There were disputes and fights among them. It was one of the prominent feudal lords. Charles Thopia, who in 1385 called the Ottomans to his support, because he had no faith in Venice and feared the Balshas.[16] The latter had become very powerful, owing primarily to the fact that, by breaking away from the Orthodox Church and joining in 1368 the Catholic Church, they identified themselves with Roman Catholic Albania.[17]
Charles Thopia's invitation to the Ottomans was not an isolated phenomenon for the times. Already in 1352 the Ottomans had landed at Zympe, near Gallipoli, upon the invitation of John Cantacuzenus, the rival of the Palaeologi.[18] A coalition of Albanian lords, formed under Balsha II in order to oppose the enemy, was beaten at Savra, near the Vijosa (Voioussa) River, and Balsha II fell.[19] in Ottoman chronicles, this expedition bears the name of “Karlili”," that is, Charles' land (that is, Charles Thopia's).[20] It appears that after this Ottoman victory the principal Albanian lords recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan.[21]
However, the situation in Albania did not alter substantially. As vassals, the Albanian feudal lords were allowed to preserve their possessions and positions, on condition that they paid the tribute (harac), sent their sons as hostages to the Sultan's court, and furnished auxiliary troops.[22] Albanian forces, under the command of Coia Zaccaria, Dimitri Jonima, George Dukagjini and Dushmani, participated in the battle of Ankara in 1402.[23] The real change came with the next step. The true conquest was the establishment of the military fiefs, granted by the Ottoman state, but as a rule to be held and not possessed, the so-called timars.[24]
Skenderbeg, even early in his youth, could not help being aware of the political and religious complexity of Albania. Originally, his family was not among the most eminent in the country. His father, Gjon Castrioti, had succeeded in extending his domains around Tirana, Mati, Dibra, Mirdita, and as far as Prizren.[25] In the feudal manner, he had reinforced his position by marrying off his daughters to neighboring Albanian and Serbian rulers, regardless as to whether they were Catholics or Orthodox.[26] His son-in-law, Stefan Crnojevic, the ruler of Zenta (Montenegro), remained Orthodox and a defender of Orthodoxy, even when Venice appointed him its captain for Zenta.[27] In 1410, Yigit pasha of Uskub (Skopje) forced Gjon Castrioti to recognize the suzerainty of the Sultan.[28] On January 11 of the same year he informed the Venetian Senate that the Sultan was exerting pressure on him to give his son - which one is not specified in the document - as a hostage and permit his armies to pass through his territories to attack Venetian possessions.[29]
Barletius' statement that Skenderbeg was taken to Murad II’s court as a hostage when he was nine years old is not convincing. F. S. Noli has pointed out its many contradictions.[30] He seems to have been sent to the palace of that Sultan after 1426, for in that year Gjon Castrioti with his four sons, among whom George (Skenderbeg), donated to the monastery of Chilandar two villages,[31] while between 1426 and 1431 the name of George is again mentioned in connection with the purchase he made of the St. George tower and four brotherhoods in the same Serbian monastery.[32] As a consequence, the Albanian hero could not have been a child but an adult when he was taken as a hostage to Murad II’s court and began to live in an Ottoman environment. Although converted to Islam, he could not have forgotten his Christian religion; most probably he was a Crypto-Christian. At the same time he was too old to pass through the long education of the pages of the palace (ic oglans),[33] but he must have received a good military training, for he distinguished himself as a commander.
Skenderbeg's absence from Albania as a hostage at the Sultan’s palace has been recently questioned. Bishop F. S. Noli maintains that in 1428 Skenderbeg was probably in Albania, although serving in the Ottoman army, because in a letter from Venice it is implied that he received orders from his father rather than from the Sultan.[34] The interpretation given to the letter by the Albanian bishop is rather
subjective. From this letter (17 August 1428) it is learned that Gjon Castrioti, in addition to requesting the Venetian Senate that he be allowed to cross the frontier together with his family, in the event of an Ottoman invasion, begged them that they did not regard responsible his son, "el qual e fato turco e Mulsaman," if he invaded the possessions of the Republic upon order from the Sultan.[35] Because the Venetian Senate expressed the opinion that the father (Gjon Castrioti) could order his son [to refrain from invasion],[36] F.S. Noli jumps to the conclusion that "Skenderbeg was living at home in Albania, that he was sent by his father occasionally to serve with Albanian contingents in the Turkish army and that his father could order him to disregard the Sultan's orders."[37] Such a conclusion is unwarranted. Skenderbeg, as a commander of the Sultan's army, could very well be ordered, no matter where he was stationed at the time, to accompany the Ottoman army in its invasion of Venetian territory in Albania. The Albanian bishop holds further that it is not necessary to assume that the Albanian hero was converted to Islam at Murad IIs court, but rather "under the gentle persuasion" of his father, who became a Moslem, together with his sons, after the defeat of 1430, in order to weather the storm and salvage whatever he could.[38] This hypothesis, however, derives from the previous unsound conclusion. Scholars - and recently the late Franz Babinger - have been of the opinion that Skenderbeg was taken as a hostage to Murad II’s palace and there converted to Islam and called Skenderbeg.[39] It is relevant to mention in this connection that in a Venetian document of July 1448 the Albanian hero is referred to as “l’Ottomano,” a name which the Albanian lords had attributed to him,[40] implying that they regarded him, more than any one among themselves, as having been linked with service to the Sultan.
The timar system, which brought about an important change in Albania, seems to have been first introduced during the reign of Sultan Bayazid, following his 1394 campaign, at the outset in the southern part of the country, which had come under direct Ottoman control.[41] Later other conquests were made and by 1415-1417 the province of Albania, Arvanid-ili or Arnavud-ili, was constituted.[42]
But it was after 1430, when Salonica was captured from the Venetians and Janina fell after the death of Carlo Tocco (1429), that Murad II ordered a new registration of the timars in Albania, completed in 1432 as the record-book of the sandjak of Albania (Suret-i defier-i Sancak-I Arvanid, ed. by H. Inalcik, [Ankara, 1954].) At this time the province of Albania, under direct Ottoman rule, comprised the lands from Croya (Akcahissar) to the north as far as Philates to the south. The timars in it were not held exclusively by Moslems; a considerable number of them had been granted to Christians. Out of 335 timars 56 were assigned to Christians, that is, 16 percent, the rest being held by Albanian renegades or Moslems transferred from Anatolia. Most of the Christian timars were around Berat, 17 of them; 11 of them were located in the district (vilayet, in the old meaning) of Pavlo Kurtik, south of Tirana; 7 were around Croya; and the rest dispersed. In addition, the Ottoman state granted a timar to the Metropolitan of Berat and a timar to each of the bishops of Kanina, Croya and Cartalos (the region between Elbasan, Berat and Tomorice). A number of these Christian timars - nineteen - are referred to as "ancient" (kadimi), accompanied sometimes by the mention: "He has been in possession of it for a long time" or "He is in possession of a decree (berat) of the late Sultan."[43] This record-book of timars in Albania proves that it was not necessary to be a Moslem in order to hold a timar. Of course, a timariote would be favored if he espoused Islam.
Were these Christian timariotes Orthodox or Catholic? It is hard to speak with certainty. However, taking into account that their timars fell within the wedge Ochrida-Croya-Valona and more to the south, one would be inclined to believe that they were in the majority Orthodox.[44] The lands to the north of Croya were in the hands of Catholic Albanian lords who had recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan. In 1416 the Castrioti lands (Yuvan-ili) are referred to as belonging to a vassal. The Ottomans supported these vassals, as for instance Balsha III, in their conflicts with the Venetians. According to the record-book of 1432, the Ottoman population of the Sandjak of Albania was composed of the military and religious personnel, while the timariotes together with their men did not surpass 800. The rest of the population, that is, the great masses, were Christian.[45]
One might wonder why the Ottomans, who were so harsh on the Bulgarian and Serbian aristocracies, were so conciliatory with the Albanian nobility. In the first place, the Albanian feudal lords did not fight against the Ottomans, as the Bulgarians and Serbs, in an orderly battle, with united and compact forces. In that country the Ottomans were confronted by small local rulers, independent the ones from the
others and ready to come to terms with the conqueror in order to maintain their positions, either by accepting to become vassals of the Sultan or change their status into that of timariotes.[46] Other local considerations contributed as well. The Albanians were inclined to rebellion and their land was well protected by mountains. Venice, a potential enemy, occupied an important part of the littoral, and the
Adriatic could be freely used for agitation and support from Italy. Being a warlike people, the Albanians would be ideally suited for a military state like that of the Ottomans. Besides, it should not be difficult for the feudal lords to espouse Islam, for in pre-Ottoman Albania there was the tradition of wavering between Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy. The propagation and the establishment of Islam in Albania seem to have been primarily due to the participation of the local nobility in the timar system and in the affairs of the state.[47]
The registration of the timars may be regarded as the starting point of the Albanian resistance in the next decades. At the outset, some villages, especially in Kurvelesh, refused to be registered, obviously for fear of taxation. In other localities, the peasants murdered the Ottoman timariotes. Big Albanian feudal lords, who had been deprived of parts of their lands by the Ottoman state in order to distribute them as timars to Ottoman Sipahis, were dissatisfied. George Arianiti Comnen was the first to revolt and kill numerous Ottoman sipahis, while Thopia Zenebessi laid siege on Argirocastro. The insurgents were joined by other feudal lords, and in the winter of 1432-33 they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sultan's army in the valley of the Shkumbi River, near Berzeshta.[48] Encouraged by these developments, Christian lords of the center and the north joined the rebellion, which took the Ottomans two years to put down. The latter employed all the armies of Rumelia, because they were afraid that the success of the revolt could arouse hopes for a new crusade in Hungary.[49]
Although the insurrection of 1432-33 was primarily that of vassals and timariotes for their own interests, it was at the same time a war of Christianity against Islam, for the leaders were Christian and so were the people who followed them. The Christian West hailed the victories of George Arianiti Comnen. His reputation would have attained greater heights had it not been overshadowed by that of Skenderbeg.[50]
It is natural to ask now: Where was Skenderbeg at this time? There is no information in Western documents - perhaps because he was not in Albania or he was not well-known - and no light has been shed as yet from the Ottoman archives. Until 1438 we are in the dark. In that year, the Albanian hero had been appointed governor of the district of Croya (subasi, in Turkish), but in 1440 his appointment was revoked. H. Inalcik, however, who has given this bit of information, does not account for the revocation. He only adds that Skenderbeg wanted then to seize Croya and all the lands of his father, holding them not as a timariote but possessing them as a vassal.[51] Skenderbeg's life becomes known, thanks to Western archival material, after his return to Croya in 1443, following the defeat of the Ottomans near Nish by the Christian forces commanded by Janos Hunyadi.
Upon his arrival at Croya, the national hero returned to the faith of his forefathers. His move was not just diplomatic, as that of his father. His order to the Moslem settlers and the renegades was to choose between Christianity and death, declaring thus a religious war: the Cross against the Crescent.[52]
Until this moment, Skenderbeg's surroundings had been Albanian, though religiously mixed, and Ottoman. He kept a reminiscence of the latter until the end of his life: his name Skenderbeg. From now on his environment was going to be Albania, exclusively Ottoman and for the most part Catholic, and the Christian West. Because of the stress which Skenderbeg placed on religion, a question arises at this juncture
as to the attitude of the Albanian Orthodox toward the Council of Florence (1439) for the union of the Churches. Nothing seems to have been written about it. What is vaguely known is that the Archbishopric of Ochrida, on which several Orthodox bishoprics on Albanian territory depended, held a rebellious attitude.[53] Skenderbeg's importance on religion may be explained politically by the consideration that in a war against the Ottomans Christianity could serve as a link among all the Albanians and that the only external assistance he could expect would come from the Christian West.
Skenderbeg acted first in environment close to him. His swift success in acquiring the possessions of his father enhanced his prestige among the people and the Albanian feudal lords, who now thought that the opportunity had come to throw off the Ottoman rule and regain their lands. Hunyadi's conquests and rumors that the West was preparing a crusade raised their hopes. Thus, when the Albanian hero called for a
convention to be held at Alessio in 1444, all the feudal lords inland and along the coast from southern Epirus to the Bosnian boundaries attended it.[54] The League which was formed elected unanimously Skenderbeg as commander-in-chief of its army, each member of the League remaining free to determine the financial and military aid to be contributed.[55]
Venice was invited to the meeting, but it sent only observers to watch and report. The Serenissima did not want to expose itself because of its trade interests with the Ottomans. However, by permitting Skenderbeg to hold his convention at Alessio, which was under Venetian sovereignty, it appeared to encourage the Albanians against Ottoman domination.[56]
The relations between the Albanian leader and Venice had their ups and downs. Both parties seem to have been mistrustful of each other. Immediately after the victory of Torviolli (29 June 1444) over the Ottomans, Venice endeavored to render the League inactive, if possible to break it up. Perhaps it was afraid that with a strong Albanian League it might loose its possessions in Albania.[57] But on 12 February 1445 the Venetian Senate confirmed to Skenderbeg and his brother Stanisha the concessions it had granted to their father and recognized them as citizens of Venice, offering them shelter in case of need.[58] Again in 1447 relations between the Albanian League and Venice were at a low ebb, the latter supporting the house of the Zaccarias, an Albanian feudal lord of the north, in a dispute with the League. In the war which broke out against Venice, Skenderbeg seems to have been aided by the Serbian Despot Djuradj Smederevac, who saw in the strengthening of the Serenissima peril for the Serbian coast.[59] The Venetian Senate was so infuriated against him that on 4 May 1448 it accepted an offer by a prominent person - the name is not mentioned in the document - to assassinate him for a yearly pension of 100 ducats.[60] Venice tried hard to separate from Skenderbeg some Albanian lords and incite at the same time the Ottomans against him.[61] The Ottomans came to the assistance of the Venetians, but both were beaten in the summer of 1448. The treaty that was signed with Venice (4 October 1448) was a compromise, for Skenderbeg could not carry on war on two fronts.[62] Yet, a kind of undeclared war continued. Only six days after the conclusion of the treaty, Venice ordered its proveditor in Albania to urge the Ottomans to turn against the Albanian leader.[63] On the other hand, on 14 September 1453, the Venetian Senate thanked him for having maintained the pact with the Republic and tor his willingness to intervene for peace between Venice and the Serbian Despot.[64] But peace with Venice was really achieved in 1463, when it needed him as an ally in its war with the Ottomans. The Venetian Senate was glad to accept - while discussing with Mathias Corvinus of Hungary the war against the Ottomans [65] - Skenderbeg's offer (20 August 1463) to rise against Mehmed II.[66] It recognized then his son, Gjon, as a citizen and admitted him to the Venetian nobility with the right of membership to the Grand Council.[67] In 1464 there were rumors in Venice that Skenderbeg had come into an understanding with the Ottomans.[68] The Serene Republic had not much trust in its Albanian ally.
As long as his war against the Ottomans was successful, Skenderbeg had few troubles in the Albanian environment. True, the Ottomans managed at the outset to alienate, through intrigues, a few of the lords of the League and win them over to their side.[69] A division was also caused in the League by the quarrel between the Zaccarias and the Dukagjinis.[70] But the great troubles began with the Ottoman victory of Berat (July 1455). Many of the members of the League wanted to desert; they hesitated only whether to go to the Sultan's side or to that of the Doge. In 1456 Venice, which had been active in encouraging desertion, appointed George Arianiti Comnen, who in the meantime had become Skenderbeg's father-in-law, as the captain of Albania from Scutari to Durazzo.[71] On the other hand, Moses of Dibra, George Arianiti’s nephew, one of the ablest commanders of the Albanian forces, Nicholas and Paul Dukagjini, and Hamza Castrioti deserted to the Ottomans. Hamza, Skenderbeg's nephew, abandoned the Albanian leader allegedly because he had been deprived of his right to inherit the Castrioti domains; the Ottomans acclaimed him as the new ruler of Albania under the Sultan's protection.[72] However, in northern Albania and on both sides of Mount Tomor dominated Skenderbeg's faithful feudal lords and chieftains.[73] Gjon Musachi, who later fled to Italy, explains all these desertions of local lords as provoked by Skenderbeg's annexation of their territories. One would regard it natural for the Albanian leader to be as ambitious as any other local lord and try to increase his power, it was equally natural for him to free himself of those centrifugal forces, annex their territories, and unify the country against both the Sultan and the Venetians under the protection of Alphonse V of Naples.[74]
King Alphonse V dispatched Catalans to Berat who fought on the side of Skenderbeg. They witnessed that he “chome lion se messe fra quelli turchi."[75] The relations between the Albanian hero and the Aragonian-Neapolitan King seem to have started in 1447, when Skanderbeg was at war with both Venice and the Ottomans, their common enemies. Alphonse V, pursuing the tradition of his predecessors, cherished the ambition to expand in the Balkans and build a Mediterranean empire. Venice and the Ottomans stood in his way. On 14 December 1447 he commended Skenderbeg on his decisiveness in the war against the Sultan's armies and offered him and his family asylum, in the event of need, promising also future assistance.[76] The relations between the two grew closer when Mehmed II came to the throne in January 1451. The new Sultan had ambitions which ran contrary to those of Alphonse V. He considered himself successor to the Roman emperors and dreamed of capturing Constantinople and Rome. Albania was an obstacle to the realization of his dream. On 26 March 1451 a pact was concluded at Gaeta between the King of Naples and Skenderbeg, whereby the Albanian leader recognized the suzerainty of Alphonse V, who would grant him and his relatives any fiefs he might choose in his kingdom. Another condition of the treaty was that as soon as Skenderbeg recovered his lands from the Ottomans, with the help of the Neapolitan King, he would go personally and pay homage to him.[77] Such pacts of vassalship were signed with other Albanian lords. With this network of treaties, the League of Alessio was placed under King Alphonse V, with Skenderbeg as Captain General.[78] When Musachi Thopia was apparently reluctant to collaborate with Skenderbeg, the King of Naples reminded him in March 1455 that he should unite with the Albanian hero and should work in agreement with his own Vice-Roy in Albania, Ramon d'Ortaf.[79]
Skenderbeg came in touch with the southern Italian environment when he visited Alphonse V in 1453, after the fall of Constantinople; but he really experienced it when the illegitimate son of his supporter, Ferdinand I (1458-1494), inherited the Kingdom of Naples. As this Kingdom was claimed by the French house of Anjou, a war of succession broke out. Ferdinand invited Skenderbeg to assist him against the
Neapolitan barons and the French pretender, Rene d'Anjou. Having patched up his differences with the neighbors he was at war (Venice, the Dukagjinis and the Ottomans), he set sail for Barletta, where he landed on 25 August 1461. He succeeded in freeing the besieged Ferdinand in the neighborhood of that city and harassed the obsolete cavalry of the condottiere Giacomo Piccinino. He also saved Trani that was about to fall in enemy hands. His blitz raids amazed those who witnessed them.[80] He fought his enemies, we are told by Francesco Sforza's Ambassador to the royal camp, "a mode suo," that is "he killed those who fell in his hands and did not make prisoners,”[81] This apparently was the method Skenderbeg used in Albania, where prisoners could be a great burden. It shocked the Italians of his time, who had not experienced the ferocity of wars. Among them, the wars carried on by mercenaries, were more or less "delle manovre incruenti," in which seldom the participants remained wounded or dead.[82] In January 1462, Skenderbeg received word from his wife that the Sultan's armies were approaching the frontiers; he left the next month. The war of the Neapolitan succession dragged for almost two more years, but Skenderbeg's arrival at Barletta marked a turning point.[83]
Skenderbeg's contribution to the Italian expedition has been dismissed by some historians, on the basis of Pius II’s Commentaries, as a fiction.[84] Bishop Noli has tried to vindicate it by referring to Barletius, Pontano and to the testimony of Ferdinand himself. Today we possess another testimony in a letter which Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan, addressed to Skenderbeg on 26 October 1461. He expresses his thanks to him for having come to Italy so well equipped to serve his King and manifest such great fidelity and affection by abandoning his own affairs in Albania. The King was deeply obligated to him. He states how useful Skenderbeg was at Barletta, and still is, inspiring great terror to his enemies. His arrival had contributed to the enhancement of His Majesty's reputation, for which he would be rewarded.[85] Even when he departed for Albania, Skenderbeg expressed the intention not to abandon the war in Italy but "retornare al bono tempo. " [86] King Ferdinand recompensed him later with fiefs in Puglia and an annual provision of 1,200 ducats.[87]
Taking part in the war in Italy, Skenderbeg demonstrated a sense of gratitude for the support he had received from the Aragonians of the Kingdom of Naples in the war against the Ottomans. Perhaps a present day historian of the period, F. Pall, does not exaggerate when, in contrasting the Albanian hero and the Italian environment in which he had been active, he writes: "E anche uomini di cosi calcolata avvedutezza, cosi astuti e cosi privi di scrupoli, in quell' ambiente quattrocentesco, accerbamente egoistico e di generale slealta, come erano lo Sforza e Ferrante d'Aragona, si mostrano-puo darsi addirittura per questo! - particolarmente sensibili di fronte a tanta liberalita d'animo ed a una cosi schietta lealta."[88]
Another environment Skenderbeg came to know well was that of the Papacy. From Eugene IV to Paul II all the popes took a deep interest in his anti-Ottoman war and they were generous not only with benedictions but with material aid as well. He fought mainly under the direct orders of the popes and, when he cooperated with other powers, he did so in as far as he was authorized by the popes themselves.[89]
The Papacy in the first half of the fifteenth century passed through serious troubles, which had shaken the Catholic Church; the Great Schism of the West ended but in 1417. The troubles continued with the Council of Basel (1431-49), which contested the supremacy of the pope over the Church Council. Such ideas were at the root of the Pragmatical Sanction of Bourges (7 July 1438), which gave rise to a movement for the creation of a French national church.[90] It was natural for the popes now to be concerned with the prestige of their institution and the consolidation of its power. When they turned their action against the Ottomans, they thought first in those terms – the threat which the Ottoman advance represented - and then about the salvation of Christianity from the domination of Islam.[91]
When in 1450 Skenderbeg, after a five-month siege of Croya, was able to push back Murad II, Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455), full of joy and enthusiasm, ordered that a part of the money collected from the indulgences of the jubilee year 1450 in the cities of Dalmatia and the Primorje be paid to the brave warrior of the Christian cause.[92] After the defeat of the crusaders in Varna in 1444, the Sultanas retreat from Croya was the first Christian success. The pope addressed letters to Ragusa and Cattaro that they deliver a part of the collected sum to Skenderbeg himself or men of his confidence.[93] The Senate of Ragusa asked that their city be exempted from the 1450 jubilee tax, taking into account its services to Christian causes, in particular the support given to Skenderbeg for whom it had but praises.[94] Cattaro, on the other hand, requested that of the 1,500 ducats assigned to Skenderbeg one-third remain as a subsidy for the Cathedral of the City.[95]
Skenderbeg visited Rome for the first time in the same year he visited Alphonse V, when the capture of Constantinople shook Europe and especially Italy.[96] It was not a completely new environment for the Albanian hero. In his homeland he had been surrounded by Catholic clergymen as advisers and friends. Pope Nicholas V was thinking at that time of the defense of Hungary, Bosnia and Albania.[97] On 30 September 1453 he promulgated the solemn Crusade Bull, setting as an immediate goal to clear the way for the constitution of a Christian anti-Ottoman bloc by eliminating the discords among the Christian powers, particularly those of Italy.[98] In Albania, he intervened in the conflict between Skenderbeg, on the one hand, and Nicholas and Paul Dukagjini, on the other. The Dukagjinis had turned against the Albanian leader and had come to an understanding with the Ottomans, to the detriment of the Christian cause. Pope Nicholas V, we are told in a document of 22 August 1454, issued an interdict which compelled them to break with the Ottomans and make peace with Skenderbeg.[99]
Following the death of Nicholas V (25 March 1455), his successor, Callistus III (1455-1458), took over the Crusade as his principal mission. He confirmed and amplified the Bolla Crociata with his own bull of 15 May 1455. When he started to put his project into application, he reconfirmed as nuncio for the Crusade in Albania the active and influential Paolo Angeli-Dushi, Archbishop of Kraja, who would act in understanding with Skenderbeg. The Archbishop's duties were extended also to Dalmatia and Serbia, perhaps in order to collect subsidies for Albania in the former and in order to sustain the vacillating position in the latter, which represented a menace to that country.[100] Callistus was negotiating with Alphonse V, who was dissatisfied with the conduct of Venice,[101] about the commander of the Christian armies in Albania.[102]
Although Mehmed II in the spring of 1457 invaded Albania, laying siege on Croya and devastating the countryside, Callistus III's confidence in Skenderbeg did not decrease. He wrote to him on 9 June 1457: “Noi, diletto figlio, abbiamo sempre avuto un' ottima opinione della Tua Nobilta . . . ne piccola e presso i Cattolici la tua gloria, illustrata da tante ben condotte imprese e da una certa perpetua fortuna vittoriosa.”[103] On 10 September 1457, the pope ordered that the tithe (decima) collected in Dalmatia be divided in three equal parts: one for the King of Hungary, the second for the King of Bosnia, and the third as soon as possible for Skenderbeg, whom the Ottomans had surrounded from all sides.[104] A day later, he urged Skenderbeg to hold heroically against the Ottomans. At the same time he ordered that a part of his fleet sail to the Albanian leader's assistance.[105] On 17 September 1457, Callistus went further and informed Skenderbeg that he had ordered the collector Giovanni Navarr to give all the amount collected for the Crusade to him, as defender “of the Catholic faith.”[106] The pope called Skenderbeg “atleta di Dio,” multiplying his praises, when he became aware with time that the rulers of Europe had only promises but not actions. When he solicited money for the crusade, toward the end of his life, Albania held the first place in his heart.[107]
Callistus III bequeathed to Pius II (1458-1464) the idea of a great crusade to be organized with the united forces of Europe and to the carried out through Albania. With the Congress of Mantua in 1459, the new pope made the first attempt for the promotion of a general crusade against the Ottomans. Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan, took also part in it, promising military contribution. He was a good friend of Skenderbeg, ready with promises but rather thrifty with actions. It is true, on the other hand, that Sforza had no direct interest in the East, and this accounted for his indifference in the anti-Ottoman wars.[108] On 14 January 1460, we are informed, Pius II emanated with a special document the resolutions of the Council of Mantua.[109] As Skenderbeg had difficulties with Lek Dukagjini and his brother, the pope ordered them that if, within fifteen days they had not broken all connections with the Ottomans, they would be excommunicated.[110] Preparing himself for a decisive battle, Pius II relied, besides other powers, on Skenderbeg, to whom he alloted Macedonia in his partition plan of the Ottoman State. [111]
On 22 October 1463, Pius II called the Christian world to arms against the Ottomans. But the effect of his bull was very weak. Europe of that day was greatly split and its rulers and the Italian republics engaged in their own particular interests. Under such circumstances, the anti-Ottoman war occupied a secondary place.[112] On 18 November 1463, it was communicated to the Duke of Milan that in the papal Curia Cardinal Pavia had proposed that the Christian Armies be assembled either in Albania or in Ragusa. The pope seemed to agree: “Sua Santite dice, che it paese de Albania e forte e quando pur tutto lo sforzo del Turco se venesse, chi non potesse cossi presto andare in dentro . . .”[113] When Skenderbeg, in April 1464, asked for assistance against the Ottomans, the pope comforted him with the promise that the beginning of the crusade was imminent and that he himself would escort the fleet to Dalmatia. He hoped to land at Ragusa and then meet with the troops of Mathias Corvinus and those of Skenderbeg.[114] But on 14 August 1464 Pius II died in Ancona and his crusade collapsed.
His successor, Paul II (1464-1473), in September or October 1464, had worked out a project for another Crusade against the Ottomans. Apart from the Albanian hero, he hoped to receive help from the Sultan of Caramania.[115] The Moslem world, too, was divided and had its troubles. In November 1465 the Caramanian ruler had dispatched an envoy to Venice to conclude an anti-Ottoman pact.[116] Already some
years before (1456?), he had sent to the pope a project of how the Ottomans could be expelled from Europe. For him, the Hungarians and the Albanians under Skenderbeg were going to play the most significant role. When the Hungarians would cross the Danube and the Caramanians would attack in Asia Minor, Skenderbeg, reinforced by armies from Italy, should march toward Greek territory occupied by the Ottomans.[117] But Paul II failed also in starting the Crusade war. The time had passed when Pope Urban II (1088 1099) appealed for a crusade and masses of people left for the Orient.
In the meantime, the Ottoman offensive, particularly in 1466 under the command of Balaban pasha, an Albanian renegade, proved destructive. The whole of Albania, except Croya, was in Ottoman hands. The situation was so grave that Skenderbeg had to leave in distress for Italy to solicit support. He went first to Rome (12 December 1466).[118] The assertions of Barletius that in Rome the Albanian leader obtained easily from the pope and the cardinals all the assistance he needed and was satisfied are contradicted by new documents.[119] Although the cardinals met to consider the aid to be accorded to Skenderbeg, no effective support came.[120] “Desperate,” as he arrived in Rome, so hedeparted from it, after a stay of more than two months.[121] The environment of Rome had disappointed him deeply this time. He would remark ironically, we are told in documents, “Nante voria fare Guerra alia ghiesa che al Turco,” or that he had not believed “se potesse trovare la mazore crudelitate al mondo cha in quisti preti!”[122] From Rome Skenderbeg went to Naples, where he visited King Ferdinand. His assistance was not substantial, but it was all he could get.[123]
Upon his return to Albania, in the beginning of April 1467, Skenderbeg resumed the war against Balaban pasha successfully. Soon after, however, the devastating campaign of Sultan Mehmed II followed. Paul II, partly under the influence of the atmosphere of panic created in Italy, dispatched twice subsidies to Skenderbeg.[124] On 8 July 1467, Ferdinand II was advised that a great part of the population of Durazzo and the surroundings had left for Italy;[125] eight days later the court of Milan was informed of their passage to Puglia.[126]
On 17 January 1468 the Albanian national hero died in Alessio and was buried in the Cathedral of St. Nicholas of that city, which he had rebuilt a few years before.[127] For 24 years he opposed in his own environment the preponderant Ottoman forces, delaying their expansion to the West. Ragusa had several times offered refuge to Skenderbeg's family on its islands, particularly on Mljet (Milete),[128] but his widow and son expressed the desire to go to the Kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand I entrusted Ieronimo Carvino, one of his intimates, to visit and invite them on his part to come and settle in his Kingdom, where he would receive them “come si accoglie una madre ed un figlio” and that he would leave them not only the possessions he had donated to Skenderbeg but would also assign others to them.[129] They left for Italy, where they settled in the Kingdom of Naples, to be followed later by waves of other emigrants.
NOTES
1. Cf. G. M. Monti, "La dominazione napoletana in Albania: Carlo I d'Angio, prime re degli Albanesi," Rivista d’Albania, I (1940), 50.
2. Ibid., 55.
3. M. Sufflay, Srbi i Arbanasi, (Belgrade, 1925), pp. 78-79; L. v. Thalloczy, “Di albanische Diaspora," in Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen, ed. by L. v. Thalloczy, (Munich and Leipzig, 1916), I, p. 332; C. Jirecek, "Albanien in der Vergangenheit,” in ibid., pp. 73-75.
4. M. Sufflay, op. cit p. 94.
5. Ibidem.
6. See ibid., pp. 40-41 and 95.
7. Ibid., p. 122.
8. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
9. Ibid, p. 41.
10. Ibid. p. 98.
11. C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben (Gotha, 1918), II, 1, p. 109.
12. Cf. M. Sufflay, "Die Kirchenzustande im vorturkischen Albanien. Die orthodoxe Durchbruchszone im Katohschen Damme,” in Illyrisch- Albanische Forschungen, I, pp. 190 191.
13. C. Jirecek, op. cit.. p. 143.
14. M. Sufflay, Srbi i Arbanasi, p. 95. For the various sources dealing with Albanian feudal families, see F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiten (Munich, 1960), pp, 6 n. 2, 12 n. 2, 13 n. 2.
15. F. Pall, "I rapporti Italo-Albenesi intorno alla meta del secolo XV" (Documenti inediti con introduzione e note storico-cntiche), Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, Terza serie, IV (1965), Doc. X, p. 169.
16. The origin of the Balshas is controversial. Some scholars think that they were Serbs (M. Sufflay, Th. Ippen), others Albanians (F. S. Noli), others Rumanians (N. Iorga), and still others Vlachs related to Albanian nobility (C. Jirecek).
17. See F. S. Noli, George Castrioti Scanderbeg (1405-1468), (New York, 1947), p. 9; Th. Ippen, "Contribution a l’histoire de l’Albanie du XllIe au XVe siecle (1204-1444)," Albania (Paris), IV (1932), 32.
18. G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, (New Brunswick, NJ., 1957), p. 473.
19. N. Iorga, Geschichle des osmanischen Reiches, (Gotha, 1918), 1, p. 255.
20. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," The Encyclopedia of Islam. (Leiden and Lon-
don, 1958), p. 674.
21. N. lorga, op. cit., I, p. 261.
22. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens en Albanie au XVe siecle, d'apres un registre de timars Ottoman," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs, IV (1952). 120.
23. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 674.
24. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens ...,” 120.
25. See F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 21; Th. Ippen, op. cit., p. 34.
26. F. S. Noli, ibid., p. 21.
27. See in the yet unpublished documents from the Venetian State Archives by G. Valentini, 1453, Xl, 5, Sen., Mar., Ro5, C.ll (10) t.
28. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 674.
29. J. Radonic, Djuradj Kastriot Skenderbeg i Albanija u XV veku (Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Spomenik XCV, drugi razred 74) (Belgrade, 1942), Doc. No. 1.
30. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 29.
31. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 3.
32. Ibid. Doc. No. 4.
33. Cf. A. E. Vakalopoulos, Historia tou Neou Hellenismou, (History of Modern Hellenism) (Thessaloniki, 1964), II, pp. 56-58.
34. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 30.
35. J. Radonic, op. cit.. Doc. No. 5.
36. Ibid.
37. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 30.
38. Ibid.
39. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit, (Munich, 1953), p. 55.
40. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 20.
41. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . . ," p. 122.
42. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675 and 'Timariotes chretiens . .. ,"p. 122.
43. Ibid, pp. 118-120.
44. Cf. M. Sufflay, "Die Kirchenzustande ...,"p. 189.
45. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675.
46. N. Iorga, op. cit., p. 270; H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . .,"p. 124.
47. Cf. ibid. p. 131.
48. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . .” pp. 128-129 and "Arnawutluk," p. 675; C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben, 11, 1, pp. 154 and 171.
49. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675.
50. F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiten, p. 9.
51. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675. The authors of Historia e Shqiperise Vellim i Pare (Universiteti Shteteror i Tiranes, Instituti i Historise dhe I Gjuhesise), (Tirana, 1959), writing about Skenderbeg in the period 1438-1440, mention "new documents discovered recently testify" (p. 271), they do not give the slightest explanation as to the documents themselves. It is evident that they refer to H. Inalcik and to F. S. Noli's work (p. 31), the latter being questionable.
52. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
53. See A.-P. Pechayre, "L’archeveche d’Ochrida de 1394 a 1767. A propos d'un ouvrage recent," Echos d'Orient, 39 (janvier-mars 1936), p. 188. The work reviewed is by I. Snegarov, Istorija na okridskata arkiepiskopija-patriarchija (1394-1767), (Sofia, 1924).
54. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer, p. 56, See for the names of the lords who attended it F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
55. Ibid, p. 37.
56. lbid.
57. Ibid. p. 39.
58. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 12.
59. Cf. C. Jirecek, Geschuhte der Serben, 11. I, pp. 188 189; J. Radonic, op. cit., p. III.
60. ibid., Doc. No. 17. F. S. Noli has misinterpreted the document by saying that the Venetians "after trying in vain to find an assassin who would murder Skenderbeg for an annual pension of 100 ducats"(p. 40) for the offer was made by the would-be assassin.
61. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 18.
62. See for conditions ibid., Doc. No. 22.
63. Ibid., Doc. No. 23.
64. Ibid., Doc. No. 69.
65. Ibid., Doc. No. 247.
66. Ibid., Doc. No. 248.
67. Ibid., Doc No. 253.
68. Ibid., Doc. Nos. 273, 274; F. Pall, op. cit., p. 135 and note 49.
69. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer . . . , p. 162.
70. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
71. F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 162.
72. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
73. F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 162.
74. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 52.
75. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 141 and Doc. 11.
76. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 16
77. Cf. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 38.
78. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 49.
79. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 91 and 92.
80. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 57-59; F. Pall, op. cit., pp. 148-149; J.Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 195, 196, 197, 198-200, 207-220, 221
81. F. Pall, op. cit., Doc. XV11: "Et vole fare la guerra al modo suo, cioe amazare chi gli venue alle mane et non fare present."
82. Ibid., p. 149.
83. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
84. See ibid., pp. 60-61. The passage in the Commentaries which has been used as a basis is the following description of Skenderbeg’s army: "... lightly armed cavalry, swift horsemen, good for looting and plundering, but useless for warfare according to the Italian style, and helpless against our spears" (F. S. Noli, p. 60; the original in Pius II, CommentaryRerum Memorabilium,[Rome, 1584], p. 302). But the Commentarii were written partly by Pius II.
85. F. Pall, op. cit., Doc. LIII.
86. Ibid., p. 150 and Doc. XIX.
87. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
88. Ibid., p. 150.
89. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 73.
90.See 3. Radonic, op. cit., p. IV; M. Sciambra, G. Valentini, 1. Parrino, "L’Albania e Skanderbeg nelpiano generate di Crociata di Callisto III (1455-1458)," Bolletino della Badia greca di Grotta-ferrata XXI (1967), 84-85 and note 6.
91. J. Radonic, op. cit., p. IV.
92. Ibid. and Doc. No. 40.
93. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 40.
94. Ibid., Doc. Nos. 36 and 60.
95. See in the yet unpublished documents from the Venetian State Archives by G. Valentini, 1451.XII.3, Sen., Mar, R°4, C.96 (95) t.
96. Cf. M. Sciambra and others, op. cit., p. 106.
97. Ibid., p. 105.
98. Ibid., p. 106.
99. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 138.
100. Cf. M. Sciambra and others, op. cit., pp. 107 and 109.
101. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 105.
102. Ibid., Doc. No. 102.
103. M. Scimabra and others, op. cit., p. 114 and note 148.
104. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 150.
105. Ibid., Doc. No. 151.
106. Ibid., Doc. No. 152; Sciambra and others, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
107. Ibid.. pp. 118-121.
108. Cf. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 127.
109. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 193.
110. Ibid.. Doc. No. 174.
111. F. Pall, op. cit., p. VI.
112. Ibid., p. 140; J. Radonic, op. cit., p. VI.
113. Ibid., Doc. No. 257.
114. Cf. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 133.
115. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 285.
116. Ibid., Doc. No. 307.
117. Ibid., Doc. No. 130.
118. Ibid., Doc. No. 340.
119. See F. Pall, op. cit., p. 143.
120. Ibid., pp. 143, 145-146; J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 344, 349.
121. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 143.
122. Ibid., Doc. LXXVII and LXXVIII.
123. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. 353.
124. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 147.
125. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 367.
126. Ibid., Doc. No. 369.
127. F. S. Noli. op. cit., p. 70.
128. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 204, 314.
129. Ibid., Doc. No. 389.
The Italian version of this paper was published in Atti, V Convegno Internationale di Studi Albanesi, Palermo, 1969, pp. 83-105. The translation appears here for the first time.
During the Late Middle Ages Albania gave rise to a number of separate administrative units. Some of these, in the highlands, were tribal and were ruled by chieftains. Other units, mostly on the littoral and not far from it, underwent the feudal influences of the states of the Italian peninsula, which attempted to use Albania - only 47 miles from the coast of Italy - as a bridgehead for their expansion in the Balkans. Others, on the contrary, came under the feudal influences of the neighboring Serbian state which was stretching out toward the Adriatic and southward. Still other units, particularly in the south and more inland, had been under the influence of Byzantine feudalism.
These various brands of feudalism, however, did not remain static. When Charles I of Anjou dreamed of expanding in the Balkans, he landed in Albania and created in 1272 the "Kingdom of Albania." In the constitution he issued are mentioned "prelates, counts, barons … of Albania" who swore allegiance to the King, who received them, together with their "vassals" under his protection.[1] But the Angevine King failed in his enterprise to conquer Constantinople and, under Andronicus II (1282-1328), the Byzantines reached again the Adriatic. In parts of northern Albania Serbs of Raska spread their sway, coming into intermittent conflicts with the Angevines.[2] At the time of Stefan Dushan, the Serbs overran Albanian territory and, in their southward
march toward Epirus and Thessaly, helped the further expansion of the Albanians in Epirus, while relatives of the Serbian King became rulers in parts of Albania.[3]
These changes in political power on Albanian soil brought about also changes in the diffusion of Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. The religious split between East and West, which occurred in 1054, intensified the opposition between the Latin north and the Greek south. The Thema of Durazzo became its most active theater. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the political oscillations were accompanied by oscillations between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Both feudal lords and bishops led a religiously amphibious life.[4]
Albanian high nobility along the Adriatic was Catholic, but in the interior, toward Ochrida - even in Croya before the arrival of the Angevines - was under the domination of Greek influence.[5] When in 1319 an alliance of European Catholic rulers directed against the Serbian King, Uros II Milutin, a "schismatic," received the blessing of the pope, Albania was entangled in the net of papal politics. The heads of the important feudal families, as the Musachi and the Arianiti, were addressed in the papal bull as “dilectii filii” and “viri catholiki” they responded that "as Catholic men they will seize the opportunity to cast off the yoke of the true schismatic and enemy of the Christian faith, the perfidious King of Serbia."[6] In the north, even two zupani on the coast of Dioclea, the Albanian Catholic Vladislav Jonima (who in 1303 had lived in the court of the Serbian King),[7] and the still Orthodox Radislav, sided with the West.[8] But the Serbs thwarted their efforts and continued to hold firmly the northern part of Albania. Pressed by the Greeks to the south and still more strongly by the Serbs to the north, the Albanian feudal lords turned to the Angevines in Durazzo and Naples for protection.[9]
It will not seem strange then that the battle between the popes of Rome and those of Avignon was reflected in Albania, the former supporting the house of the Balshas in the north and the latter that of the Thopias, who called themselves “de domo Francie” [10] around Durazzo.[11]
Although Albania was the battlefield between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, the struggle there never took a violent form. Owing to shifts in domination, the Catholic and Orthodox Albanians had acquired a capacity to adapt themselves to serve masters of opposing religious creeds, especially in the cities where the population was confessionally mixed.[12] Feudal lords, on the other hand, endeavored to be on good terms with both sides. Gjon Castrioti, the father of Skenderbeg, had Catholic clergymen and abbeys in his land, but he also sent presents to the Serbian Orthodox Monastery of Chilandar on Mount Athos.[13] Religious tolerance was also strengthened because many Albanian Catholic feudal families had kinship ties with Serbian princely Orthodox families, like the Brankovici and the Crnojevici, and some even with Byzantine emperors, as the Arianiti Comnen.[14] Also the fact that the feudal lords, in general, were small and divided rendered the constitution of two compact groups opposing each other impossible, preventing thus the rise of religious fanaticism.
Following the collapse of Stefan Dushan's empire, the number of Albanian local lords increased. There were not only the old feudal families, but also small ones emerged, the so-called "signoretti" in a Venetian document of 1461.[15] There were disputes and fights among them. It was one of the prominent feudal lords. Charles Thopia, who in 1385 called the Ottomans to his support, because he had no faith in Venice and feared the Balshas.[16] The latter had become very powerful, owing primarily to the fact that, by breaking away from the Orthodox Church and joining in 1368 the Catholic Church, they identified themselves with Roman Catholic Albania.[17]
Charles Thopia's invitation to the Ottomans was not an isolated phenomenon for the times. Already in 1352 the Ottomans had landed at Zympe, near Gallipoli, upon the invitation of John Cantacuzenus, the rival of the Palaeologi.[18] A coalition of Albanian lords, formed under Balsha II in order to oppose the enemy, was beaten at Savra, near the Vijosa (Voioussa) River, and Balsha II fell.[19] in Ottoman chronicles, this expedition bears the name of “Karlili”," that is, Charles' land (that is, Charles Thopia's).[20] It appears that after this Ottoman victory the principal Albanian lords recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan.[21]
However, the situation in Albania did not alter substantially. As vassals, the Albanian feudal lords were allowed to preserve their possessions and positions, on condition that they paid the tribute (harac), sent their sons as hostages to the Sultan's court, and furnished auxiliary troops.[22] Albanian forces, under the command of Coia Zaccaria, Dimitri Jonima, George Dukagjini and Dushmani, participated in the battle of Ankara in 1402.[23] The real change came with the next step. The true conquest was the establishment of the military fiefs, granted by the Ottoman state, but as a rule to be held and not possessed, the so-called timars.[24]
Skenderbeg, even early in his youth, could not help being aware of the political and religious complexity of Albania. Originally, his family was not among the most eminent in the country. His father, Gjon Castrioti, had succeeded in extending his domains around Tirana, Mati, Dibra, Mirdita, and as far as Prizren.[25] In the feudal manner, he had reinforced his position by marrying off his daughters to neighboring Albanian and Serbian rulers, regardless as to whether they were Catholics or Orthodox.[26] His son-in-law, Stefan Crnojevic, the ruler of Zenta (Montenegro), remained Orthodox and a defender of Orthodoxy, even when Venice appointed him its captain for Zenta.[27] In 1410, Yigit pasha of Uskub (Skopje) forced Gjon Castrioti to recognize the suzerainty of the Sultan.[28] On January 11 of the same year he informed the Venetian Senate that the Sultan was exerting pressure on him to give his son - which one is not specified in the document - as a hostage and permit his armies to pass through his territories to attack Venetian possessions.[29]
Barletius' statement that Skenderbeg was taken to Murad II’s court as a hostage when he was nine years old is not convincing. F. S. Noli has pointed out its many contradictions.[30] He seems to have been sent to the palace of that Sultan after 1426, for in that year Gjon Castrioti with his four sons, among whom George (Skenderbeg), donated to the monastery of Chilandar two villages,[31] while between 1426 and 1431 the name of George is again mentioned in connection with the purchase he made of the St. George tower and four brotherhoods in the same Serbian monastery.[32] As a consequence, the Albanian hero could not have been a child but an adult when he was taken as a hostage to Murad II’s court and began to live in an Ottoman environment. Although converted to Islam, he could not have forgotten his Christian religion; most probably he was a Crypto-Christian. At the same time he was too old to pass through the long education of the pages of the palace (ic oglans),[33] but he must have received a good military training, for he distinguished himself as a commander.
Skenderbeg's absence from Albania as a hostage at the Sultan’s palace has been recently questioned. Bishop F. S. Noli maintains that in 1428 Skenderbeg was probably in Albania, although serving in the Ottoman army, because in a letter from Venice it is implied that he received orders from his father rather than from the Sultan.[34] The interpretation given to the letter by the Albanian bishop is rather
subjective. From this letter (17 August 1428) it is learned that Gjon Castrioti, in addition to requesting the Venetian Senate that he be allowed to cross the frontier together with his family, in the event of an Ottoman invasion, begged them that they did not regard responsible his son, "el qual e fato turco e Mulsaman," if he invaded the possessions of the Republic upon order from the Sultan.[35] Because the Venetian Senate expressed the opinion that the father (Gjon Castrioti) could order his son [to refrain from invasion],[36] F.S. Noli jumps to the conclusion that "Skenderbeg was living at home in Albania, that he was sent by his father occasionally to serve with Albanian contingents in the Turkish army and that his father could order him to disregard the Sultan's orders."[37] Such a conclusion is unwarranted. Skenderbeg, as a commander of the Sultan's army, could very well be ordered, no matter where he was stationed at the time, to accompany the Ottoman army in its invasion of Venetian territory in Albania. The Albanian bishop holds further that it is not necessary to assume that the Albanian hero was converted to Islam at Murad IIs court, but rather "under the gentle persuasion" of his father, who became a Moslem, together with his sons, after the defeat of 1430, in order to weather the storm and salvage whatever he could.[38] This hypothesis, however, derives from the previous unsound conclusion. Scholars - and recently the late Franz Babinger - have been of the opinion that Skenderbeg was taken as a hostage to Murad II’s palace and there converted to Islam and called Skenderbeg.[39] It is relevant to mention in this connection that in a Venetian document of July 1448 the Albanian hero is referred to as “l’Ottomano,” a name which the Albanian lords had attributed to him,[40] implying that they regarded him, more than any one among themselves, as having been linked with service to the Sultan.
The timar system, which brought about an important change in Albania, seems to have been first introduced during the reign of Sultan Bayazid, following his 1394 campaign, at the outset in the southern part of the country, which had come under direct Ottoman control.[41] Later other conquests were made and by 1415-1417 the province of Albania, Arvanid-ili or Arnavud-ili, was constituted.[42]
But it was after 1430, when Salonica was captured from the Venetians and Janina fell after the death of Carlo Tocco (1429), that Murad II ordered a new registration of the timars in Albania, completed in 1432 as the record-book of the sandjak of Albania (Suret-i defier-i Sancak-I Arvanid, ed. by H. Inalcik, [Ankara, 1954].) At this time the province of Albania, under direct Ottoman rule, comprised the lands from Croya (Akcahissar) to the north as far as Philates to the south. The timars in it were not held exclusively by Moslems; a considerable number of them had been granted to Christians. Out of 335 timars 56 were assigned to Christians, that is, 16 percent, the rest being held by Albanian renegades or Moslems transferred from Anatolia. Most of the Christian timars were around Berat, 17 of them; 11 of them were located in the district (vilayet, in the old meaning) of Pavlo Kurtik, south of Tirana; 7 were around Croya; and the rest dispersed. In addition, the Ottoman state granted a timar to the Metropolitan of Berat and a timar to each of the bishops of Kanina, Croya and Cartalos (the region between Elbasan, Berat and Tomorice). A number of these Christian timars - nineteen - are referred to as "ancient" (kadimi), accompanied sometimes by the mention: "He has been in possession of it for a long time" or "He is in possession of a decree (berat) of the late Sultan."[43] This record-book of timars in Albania proves that it was not necessary to be a Moslem in order to hold a timar. Of course, a timariote would be favored if he espoused Islam.
Were these Christian timariotes Orthodox or Catholic? It is hard to speak with certainty. However, taking into account that their timars fell within the wedge Ochrida-Croya-Valona and more to the south, one would be inclined to believe that they were in the majority Orthodox.[44] The lands to the north of Croya were in the hands of Catholic Albanian lords who had recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan. In 1416 the Castrioti lands (Yuvan-ili) are referred to as belonging to a vassal. The Ottomans supported these vassals, as for instance Balsha III, in their conflicts with the Venetians. According to the record-book of 1432, the Ottoman population of the Sandjak of Albania was composed of the military and religious personnel, while the timariotes together with their men did not surpass 800. The rest of the population, that is, the great masses, were Christian.[45]
One might wonder why the Ottomans, who were so harsh on the Bulgarian and Serbian aristocracies, were so conciliatory with the Albanian nobility. In the first place, the Albanian feudal lords did not fight against the Ottomans, as the Bulgarians and Serbs, in an orderly battle, with united and compact forces. In that country the Ottomans were confronted by small local rulers, independent the ones from the
others and ready to come to terms with the conqueror in order to maintain their positions, either by accepting to become vassals of the Sultan or change their status into that of timariotes.[46] Other local considerations contributed as well. The Albanians were inclined to rebellion and their land was well protected by mountains. Venice, a potential enemy, occupied an important part of the littoral, and the
Adriatic could be freely used for agitation and support from Italy. Being a warlike people, the Albanians would be ideally suited for a military state like that of the Ottomans. Besides, it should not be difficult for the feudal lords to espouse Islam, for in pre-Ottoman Albania there was the tradition of wavering between Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy. The propagation and the establishment of Islam in Albania seem to have been primarily due to the participation of the local nobility in the timar system and in the affairs of the state.[47]
The registration of the timars may be regarded as the starting point of the Albanian resistance in the next decades. At the outset, some villages, especially in Kurvelesh, refused to be registered, obviously for fear of taxation. In other localities, the peasants murdered the Ottoman timariotes. Big Albanian feudal lords, who had been deprived of parts of their lands by the Ottoman state in order to distribute them as timars to Ottoman Sipahis, were dissatisfied. George Arianiti Comnen was the first to revolt and kill numerous Ottoman sipahis, while Thopia Zenebessi laid siege on Argirocastro. The insurgents were joined by other feudal lords, and in the winter of 1432-33 they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sultan's army in the valley of the Shkumbi River, near Berzeshta.[48] Encouraged by these developments, Christian lords of the center and the north joined the rebellion, which took the Ottomans two years to put down. The latter employed all the armies of Rumelia, because they were afraid that the success of the revolt could arouse hopes for a new crusade in Hungary.[49]
Although the insurrection of 1432-33 was primarily that of vassals and timariotes for their own interests, it was at the same time a war of Christianity against Islam, for the leaders were Christian and so were the people who followed them. The Christian West hailed the victories of George Arianiti Comnen. His reputation would have attained greater heights had it not been overshadowed by that of Skenderbeg.[50]
It is natural to ask now: Where was Skenderbeg at this time? There is no information in Western documents - perhaps because he was not in Albania or he was not well-known - and no light has been shed as yet from the Ottoman archives. Until 1438 we are in the dark. In that year, the Albanian hero had been appointed governor of the district of Croya (subasi, in Turkish), but in 1440 his appointment was revoked. H. Inalcik, however, who has given this bit of information, does not account for the revocation. He only adds that Skenderbeg wanted then to seize Croya and all the lands of his father, holding them not as a timariote but possessing them as a vassal.[51] Skenderbeg's life becomes known, thanks to Western archival material, after his return to Croya in 1443, following the defeat of the Ottomans near Nish by the Christian forces commanded by Janos Hunyadi.
Upon his arrival at Croya, the national hero returned to the faith of his forefathers. His move was not just diplomatic, as that of his father. His order to the Moslem settlers and the renegades was to choose between Christianity and death, declaring thus a religious war: the Cross against the Crescent.[52]
Until this moment, Skenderbeg's surroundings had been Albanian, though religiously mixed, and Ottoman. He kept a reminiscence of the latter until the end of his life: his name Skenderbeg. From now on his environment was going to be Albania, exclusively Ottoman and for the most part Catholic, and the Christian West. Because of the stress which Skenderbeg placed on religion, a question arises at this juncture
as to the attitude of the Albanian Orthodox toward the Council of Florence (1439) for the union of the Churches. Nothing seems to have been written about it. What is vaguely known is that the Archbishopric of Ochrida, on which several Orthodox bishoprics on Albanian territory depended, held a rebellious attitude.[53] Skenderbeg's importance on religion may be explained politically by the consideration that in a war against the Ottomans Christianity could serve as a link among all the Albanians and that the only external assistance he could expect would come from the Christian West.
Skenderbeg acted first in environment close to him. His swift success in acquiring the possessions of his father enhanced his prestige among the people and the Albanian feudal lords, who now thought that the opportunity had come to throw off the Ottoman rule and regain their lands. Hunyadi's conquests and rumors that the West was preparing a crusade raised their hopes. Thus, when the Albanian hero called for a
convention to be held at Alessio in 1444, all the feudal lords inland and along the coast from southern Epirus to the Bosnian boundaries attended it.[54] The League which was formed elected unanimously Skenderbeg as commander-in-chief of its army, each member of the League remaining free to determine the financial and military aid to be contributed.[55]
Venice was invited to the meeting, but it sent only observers to watch and report. The Serenissima did not want to expose itself because of its trade interests with the Ottomans. However, by permitting Skenderbeg to hold his convention at Alessio, which was under Venetian sovereignty, it appeared to encourage the Albanians against Ottoman domination.[56]
The relations between the Albanian leader and Venice had their ups and downs. Both parties seem to have been mistrustful of each other. Immediately after the victory of Torviolli (29 June 1444) over the Ottomans, Venice endeavored to render the League inactive, if possible to break it up. Perhaps it was afraid that with a strong Albanian League it might loose its possessions in Albania.[57] But on 12 February 1445 the Venetian Senate confirmed to Skenderbeg and his brother Stanisha the concessions it had granted to their father and recognized them as citizens of Venice, offering them shelter in case of need.[58] Again in 1447 relations between the Albanian League and Venice were at a low ebb, the latter supporting the house of the Zaccarias, an Albanian feudal lord of the north, in a dispute with the League. In the war which broke out against Venice, Skenderbeg seems to have been aided by the Serbian Despot Djuradj Smederevac, who saw in the strengthening of the Serenissima peril for the Serbian coast.[59] The Venetian Senate was so infuriated against him that on 4 May 1448 it accepted an offer by a prominent person - the name is not mentioned in the document - to assassinate him for a yearly pension of 100 ducats.[60] Venice tried hard to separate from Skenderbeg some Albanian lords and incite at the same time the Ottomans against him.[61] The Ottomans came to the assistance of the Venetians, but both were beaten in the summer of 1448. The treaty that was signed with Venice (4 October 1448) was a compromise, for Skenderbeg could not carry on war on two fronts.[62] Yet, a kind of undeclared war continued. Only six days after the conclusion of the treaty, Venice ordered its proveditor in Albania to urge the Ottomans to turn against the Albanian leader.[63] On the other hand, on 14 September 1453, the Venetian Senate thanked him for having maintained the pact with the Republic and tor his willingness to intervene for peace between Venice and the Serbian Despot.[64] But peace with Venice was really achieved in 1463, when it needed him as an ally in its war with the Ottomans. The Venetian Senate was glad to accept - while discussing with Mathias Corvinus of Hungary the war against the Ottomans [65] - Skenderbeg's offer (20 August 1463) to rise against Mehmed II.[66] It recognized then his son, Gjon, as a citizen and admitted him to the Venetian nobility with the right of membership to the Grand Council.[67] In 1464 there were rumors in Venice that Skenderbeg had come into an understanding with the Ottomans.[68] The Serene Republic had not much trust in its Albanian ally.
As long as his war against the Ottomans was successful, Skenderbeg had few troubles in the Albanian environment. True, the Ottomans managed at the outset to alienate, through intrigues, a few of the lords of the League and win them over to their side.[69] A division was also caused in the League by the quarrel between the Zaccarias and the Dukagjinis.[70] But the great troubles began with the Ottoman victory of Berat (July 1455). Many of the members of the League wanted to desert; they hesitated only whether to go to the Sultan's side or to that of the Doge. In 1456 Venice, which had been active in encouraging desertion, appointed George Arianiti Comnen, who in the meantime had become Skenderbeg's father-in-law, as the captain of Albania from Scutari to Durazzo.[71] On the other hand, Moses of Dibra, George Arianiti’s nephew, one of the ablest commanders of the Albanian forces, Nicholas and Paul Dukagjini, and Hamza Castrioti deserted to the Ottomans. Hamza, Skenderbeg's nephew, abandoned the Albanian leader allegedly because he had been deprived of his right to inherit the Castrioti domains; the Ottomans acclaimed him as the new ruler of Albania under the Sultan's protection.[72] However, in northern Albania and on both sides of Mount Tomor dominated Skenderbeg's faithful feudal lords and chieftains.[73] Gjon Musachi, who later fled to Italy, explains all these desertions of local lords as provoked by Skenderbeg's annexation of their territories. One would regard it natural for the Albanian leader to be as ambitious as any other local lord and try to increase his power, it was equally natural for him to free himself of those centrifugal forces, annex their territories, and unify the country against both the Sultan and the Venetians under the protection of Alphonse V of Naples.[74]
King Alphonse V dispatched Catalans to Berat who fought on the side of Skenderbeg. They witnessed that he “chome lion se messe fra quelli turchi."[75] The relations between the Albanian hero and the Aragonian-Neapolitan King seem to have started in 1447, when Skanderbeg was at war with both Venice and the Ottomans, their common enemies. Alphonse V, pursuing the tradition of his predecessors, cherished the ambition to expand in the Balkans and build a Mediterranean empire. Venice and the Ottomans stood in his way. On 14 December 1447 he commended Skenderbeg on his decisiveness in the war against the Sultan's armies and offered him and his family asylum, in the event of need, promising also future assistance.[76] The relations between the two grew closer when Mehmed II came to the throne in January 1451. The new Sultan had ambitions which ran contrary to those of Alphonse V. He considered himself successor to the Roman emperors and dreamed of capturing Constantinople and Rome. Albania was an obstacle to the realization of his dream. On 26 March 1451 a pact was concluded at Gaeta between the King of Naples and Skenderbeg, whereby the Albanian leader recognized the suzerainty of Alphonse V, who would grant him and his relatives any fiefs he might choose in his kingdom. Another condition of the treaty was that as soon as Skenderbeg recovered his lands from the Ottomans, with the help of the Neapolitan King, he would go personally and pay homage to him.[77] Such pacts of vassalship were signed with other Albanian lords. With this network of treaties, the League of Alessio was placed under King Alphonse V, with Skenderbeg as Captain General.[78] When Musachi Thopia was apparently reluctant to collaborate with Skenderbeg, the King of Naples reminded him in March 1455 that he should unite with the Albanian hero and should work in agreement with his own Vice-Roy in Albania, Ramon d'Ortaf.[79]
Skenderbeg came in touch with the southern Italian environment when he visited Alphonse V in 1453, after the fall of Constantinople; but he really experienced it when the illegitimate son of his supporter, Ferdinand I (1458-1494), inherited the Kingdom of Naples. As this Kingdom was claimed by the French house of Anjou, a war of succession broke out. Ferdinand invited Skenderbeg to assist him against the
Neapolitan barons and the French pretender, Rene d'Anjou. Having patched up his differences with the neighbors he was at war (Venice, the Dukagjinis and the Ottomans), he set sail for Barletta, where he landed on 25 August 1461. He succeeded in freeing the besieged Ferdinand in the neighborhood of that city and harassed the obsolete cavalry of the condottiere Giacomo Piccinino. He also saved Trani that was about to fall in enemy hands. His blitz raids amazed those who witnessed them.[80] He fought his enemies, we are told by Francesco Sforza's Ambassador to the royal camp, "a mode suo," that is "he killed those who fell in his hands and did not make prisoners,”[81] This apparently was the method Skenderbeg used in Albania, where prisoners could be a great burden. It shocked the Italians of his time, who had not experienced the ferocity of wars. Among them, the wars carried on by mercenaries, were more or less "delle manovre incruenti," in which seldom the participants remained wounded or dead.[82] In January 1462, Skenderbeg received word from his wife that the Sultan's armies were approaching the frontiers; he left the next month. The war of the Neapolitan succession dragged for almost two more years, but Skenderbeg's arrival at Barletta marked a turning point.[83]
Skenderbeg's contribution to the Italian expedition has been dismissed by some historians, on the basis of Pius II’s Commentaries, as a fiction.[84] Bishop Noli has tried to vindicate it by referring to Barletius, Pontano and to the testimony of Ferdinand himself. Today we possess another testimony in a letter which Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan, addressed to Skenderbeg on 26 October 1461. He expresses his thanks to him for having come to Italy so well equipped to serve his King and manifest such great fidelity and affection by abandoning his own affairs in Albania. The King was deeply obligated to him. He states how useful Skenderbeg was at Barletta, and still is, inspiring great terror to his enemies. His arrival had contributed to the enhancement of His Majesty's reputation, for which he would be rewarded.[85] Even when he departed for Albania, Skenderbeg expressed the intention not to abandon the war in Italy but "retornare al bono tempo. " [86] King Ferdinand recompensed him later with fiefs in Puglia and an annual provision of 1,200 ducats.[87]
Taking part in the war in Italy, Skenderbeg demonstrated a sense of gratitude for the support he had received from the Aragonians of the Kingdom of Naples in the war against the Ottomans. Perhaps a present day historian of the period, F. Pall, does not exaggerate when, in contrasting the Albanian hero and the Italian environment in which he had been active, he writes: "E anche uomini di cosi calcolata avvedutezza, cosi astuti e cosi privi di scrupoli, in quell' ambiente quattrocentesco, accerbamente egoistico e di generale slealta, come erano lo Sforza e Ferrante d'Aragona, si mostrano-puo darsi addirittura per questo! - particolarmente sensibili di fronte a tanta liberalita d'animo ed a una cosi schietta lealta."[88]
Another environment Skenderbeg came to know well was that of the Papacy. From Eugene IV to Paul II all the popes took a deep interest in his anti-Ottoman war and they were generous not only with benedictions but with material aid as well. He fought mainly under the direct orders of the popes and, when he cooperated with other powers, he did so in as far as he was authorized by the popes themselves.[89]
The Papacy in the first half of the fifteenth century passed through serious troubles, which had shaken the Catholic Church; the Great Schism of the West ended but in 1417. The troubles continued with the Council of Basel (1431-49), which contested the supremacy of the pope over the Church Council. Such ideas were at the root of the Pragmatical Sanction of Bourges (7 July 1438), which gave rise to a movement for the creation of a French national church.[90] It was natural for the popes now to be concerned with the prestige of their institution and the consolidation of its power. When they turned their action against the Ottomans, they thought first in those terms – the threat which the Ottoman advance represented - and then about the salvation of Christianity from the domination of Islam.[91]
When in 1450 Skenderbeg, after a five-month siege of Croya, was able to push back Murad II, Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455), full of joy and enthusiasm, ordered that a part of the money collected from the indulgences of the jubilee year 1450 in the cities of Dalmatia and the Primorje be paid to the brave warrior of the Christian cause.[92] After the defeat of the crusaders in Varna in 1444, the Sultanas retreat from Croya was the first Christian success. The pope addressed letters to Ragusa and Cattaro that they deliver a part of the collected sum to Skenderbeg himself or men of his confidence.[93] The Senate of Ragusa asked that their city be exempted from the 1450 jubilee tax, taking into account its services to Christian causes, in particular the support given to Skenderbeg for whom it had but praises.[94] Cattaro, on the other hand, requested that of the 1,500 ducats assigned to Skenderbeg one-third remain as a subsidy for the Cathedral of the City.[95]
Skenderbeg visited Rome for the first time in the same year he visited Alphonse V, when the capture of Constantinople shook Europe and especially Italy.[96] It was not a completely new environment for the Albanian hero. In his homeland he had been surrounded by Catholic clergymen as advisers and friends. Pope Nicholas V was thinking at that time of the defense of Hungary, Bosnia and Albania.[97] On 30 September 1453 he promulgated the solemn Crusade Bull, setting as an immediate goal to clear the way for the constitution of a Christian anti-Ottoman bloc by eliminating the discords among the Christian powers, particularly those of Italy.[98] In Albania, he intervened in the conflict between Skenderbeg, on the one hand, and Nicholas and Paul Dukagjini, on the other. The Dukagjinis had turned against the Albanian leader and had come to an understanding with the Ottomans, to the detriment of the Christian cause. Pope Nicholas V, we are told in a document of 22 August 1454, issued an interdict which compelled them to break with the Ottomans and make peace with Skenderbeg.[99]
Following the death of Nicholas V (25 March 1455), his successor, Callistus III (1455-1458), took over the Crusade as his principal mission. He confirmed and amplified the Bolla Crociata with his own bull of 15 May 1455. When he started to put his project into application, he reconfirmed as nuncio for the Crusade in Albania the active and influential Paolo Angeli-Dushi, Archbishop of Kraja, who would act in understanding with Skenderbeg. The Archbishop's duties were extended also to Dalmatia and Serbia, perhaps in order to collect subsidies for Albania in the former and in order to sustain the vacillating position in the latter, which represented a menace to that country.[100] Callistus was negotiating with Alphonse V, who was dissatisfied with the conduct of Venice,[101] about the commander of the Christian armies in Albania.[102]
Although Mehmed II in the spring of 1457 invaded Albania, laying siege on Croya and devastating the countryside, Callistus III's confidence in Skenderbeg did not decrease. He wrote to him on 9 June 1457: “Noi, diletto figlio, abbiamo sempre avuto un' ottima opinione della Tua Nobilta . . . ne piccola e presso i Cattolici la tua gloria, illustrata da tante ben condotte imprese e da una certa perpetua fortuna vittoriosa.”[103] On 10 September 1457, the pope ordered that the tithe (decima) collected in Dalmatia be divided in three equal parts: one for the King of Hungary, the second for the King of Bosnia, and the third as soon as possible for Skenderbeg, whom the Ottomans had surrounded from all sides.[104] A day later, he urged Skenderbeg to hold heroically against the Ottomans. At the same time he ordered that a part of his fleet sail to the Albanian leader's assistance.[105] On 17 September 1457, Callistus went further and informed Skenderbeg that he had ordered the collector Giovanni Navarr to give all the amount collected for the Crusade to him, as defender “of the Catholic faith.”[106] The pope called Skenderbeg “atleta di Dio,” multiplying his praises, when he became aware with time that the rulers of Europe had only promises but not actions. When he solicited money for the crusade, toward the end of his life, Albania held the first place in his heart.[107]
Callistus III bequeathed to Pius II (1458-1464) the idea of a great crusade to be organized with the united forces of Europe and to the carried out through Albania. With the Congress of Mantua in 1459, the new pope made the first attempt for the promotion of a general crusade against the Ottomans. Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan, took also part in it, promising military contribution. He was a good friend of Skenderbeg, ready with promises but rather thrifty with actions. It is true, on the other hand, that Sforza had no direct interest in the East, and this accounted for his indifference in the anti-Ottoman wars.[108] On 14 January 1460, we are informed, Pius II emanated with a special document the resolutions of the Council of Mantua.[109] As Skenderbeg had difficulties with Lek Dukagjini and his brother, the pope ordered them that if, within fifteen days they had not broken all connections with the Ottomans, they would be excommunicated.[110] Preparing himself for a decisive battle, Pius II relied, besides other powers, on Skenderbeg, to whom he alloted Macedonia in his partition plan of the Ottoman State. [111]
On 22 October 1463, Pius II called the Christian world to arms against the Ottomans. But the effect of his bull was very weak. Europe of that day was greatly split and its rulers and the Italian republics engaged in their own particular interests. Under such circumstances, the anti-Ottoman war occupied a secondary place.[112] On 18 November 1463, it was communicated to the Duke of Milan that in the papal Curia Cardinal Pavia had proposed that the Christian Armies be assembled either in Albania or in Ragusa. The pope seemed to agree: “Sua Santite dice, che it paese de Albania e forte e quando pur tutto lo sforzo del Turco se venesse, chi non potesse cossi presto andare in dentro . . .”[113] When Skenderbeg, in April 1464, asked for assistance against the Ottomans, the pope comforted him with the promise that the beginning of the crusade was imminent and that he himself would escort the fleet to Dalmatia. He hoped to land at Ragusa and then meet with the troops of Mathias Corvinus and those of Skenderbeg.[114] But on 14 August 1464 Pius II died in Ancona and his crusade collapsed.
His successor, Paul II (1464-1473), in September or October 1464, had worked out a project for another Crusade against the Ottomans. Apart from the Albanian hero, he hoped to receive help from the Sultan of Caramania.[115] The Moslem world, too, was divided and had its troubles. In November 1465 the Caramanian ruler had dispatched an envoy to Venice to conclude an anti-Ottoman pact.[116] Already some
years before (1456?), he had sent to the pope a project of how the Ottomans could be expelled from Europe. For him, the Hungarians and the Albanians under Skenderbeg were going to play the most significant role. When the Hungarians would cross the Danube and the Caramanians would attack in Asia Minor, Skenderbeg, reinforced by armies from Italy, should march toward Greek territory occupied by the Ottomans.[117] But Paul II failed also in starting the Crusade war. The time had passed when Pope Urban II (1088 1099) appealed for a crusade and masses of people left for the Orient.
In the meantime, the Ottoman offensive, particularly in 1466 under the command of Balaban pasha, an Albanian renegade, proved destructive. The whole of Albania, except Croya, was in Ottoman hands. The situation was so grave that Skenderbeg had to leave in distress for Italy to solicit support. He went first to Rome (12 December 1466).[118] The assertions of Barletius that in Rome the Albanian leader obtained easily from the pope and the cardinals all the assistance he needed and was satisfied are contradicted by new documents.[119] Although the cardinals met to consider the aid to be accorded to Skenderbeg, no effective support came.[120] “Desperate,” as he arrived in Rome, so hedeparted from it, after a stay of more than two months.[121] The environment of Rome had disappointed him deeply this time. He would remark ironically, we are told in documents, “Nante voria fare Guerra alia ghiesa che al Turco,” or that he had not believed “se potesse trovare la mazore crudelitate al mondo cha in quisti preti!”[122] From Rome Skenderbeg went to Naples, where he visited King Ferdinand. His assistance was not substantial, but it was all he could get.[123]
Upon his return to Albania, in the beginning of April 1467, Skenderbeg resumed the war against Balaban pasha successfully. Soon after, however, the devastating campaign of Sultan Mehmed II followed. Paul II, partly under the influence of the atmosphere of panic created in Italy, dispatched twice subsidies to Skenderbeg.[124] On 8 July 1467, Ferdinand II was advised that a great part of the population of Durazzo and the surroundings had left for Italy;[125] eight days later the court of Milan was informed of their passage to Puglia.[126]
On 17 January 1468 the Albanian national hero died in Alessio and was buried in the Cathedral of St. Nicholas of that city, which he had rebuilt a few years before.[127] For 24 years he opposed in his own environment the preponderant Ottoman forces, delaying their expansion to the West. Ragusa had several times offered refuge to Skenderbeg's family on its islands, particularly on Mljet (Milete),[128] but his widow and son expressed the desire to go to the Kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand I entrusted Ieronimo Carvino, one of his intimates, to visit and invite them on his part to come and settle in his Kingdom, where he would receive them “come si accoglie una madre ed un figlio” and that he would leave them not only the possessions he had donated to Skenderbeg but would also assign others to them.[129] They left for Italy, where they settled in the Kingdom of Naples, to be followed later by waves of other emigrants.
NOTES
1. Cf. G. M. Monti, "La dominazione napoletana in Albania: Carlo I d'Angio, prime re degli Albanesi," Rivista d’Albania, I (1940), 50.
2. Ibid., 55.
3. M. Sufflay, Srbi i Arbanasi, (Belgrade, 1925), pp. 78-79; L. v. Thalloczy, “Di albanische Diaspora," in Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen, ed. by L. v. Thalloczy, (Munich and Leipzig, 1916), I, p. 332; C. Jirecek, "Albanien in der Vergangenheit,” in ibid., pp. 73-75.
4. M. Sufflay, op. cit p. 94.
5. Ibidem.
6. See ibid., pp. 40-41 and 95.
7. Ibid., p. 122.
8. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
9. Ibid, p. 41.
10. Ibid. p. 98.
11. C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben (Gotha, 1918), II, 1, p. 109.
12. Cf. M. Sufflay, "Die Kirchenzustande im vorturkischen Albanien. Die orthodoxe Durchbruchszone im Katohschen Damme,” in Illyrisch- Albanische Forschungen, I, pp. 190 191.
13. C. Jirecek, op. cit.. p. 143.
14. M. Sufflay, Srbi i Arbanasi, p. 95. For the various sources dealing with Albanian feudal families, see F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiten (Munich, 1960), pp, 6 n. 2, 12 n. 2, 13 n. 2.
15. F. Pall, "I rapporti Italo-Albenesi intorno alla meta del secolo XV" (Documenti inediti con introduzione e note storico-cntiche), Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, Terza serie, IV (1965), Doc. X, p. 169.
16. The origin of the Balshas is controversial. Some scholars think that they were Serbs (M. Sufflay, Th. Ippen), others Albanians (F. S. Noli), others Rumanians (N. Iorga), and still others Vlachs related to Albanian nobility (C. Jirecek).
17. See F. S. Noli, George Castrioti Scanderbeg (1405-1468), (New York, 1947), p. 9; Th. Ippen, "Contribution a l’histoire de l’Albanie du XllIe au XVe siecle (1204-1444)," Albania (Paris), IV (1932), 32.
18. G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, (New Brunswick, NJ., 1957), p. 473.
19. N. Iorga, Geschichle des osmanischen Reiches, (Gotha, 1918), 1, p. 255.
20. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," The Encyclopedia of Islam. (Leiden and Lon-
don, 1958), p. 674.
21. N. lorga, op. cit., I, p. 261.
22. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens en Albanie au XVe siecle, d'apres un registre de timars Ottoman," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs, IV (1952). 120.
23. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 674.
24. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens ...,” 120.
25. See F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 21; Th. Ippen, op. cit., p. 34.
26. F. S. Noli, ibid., p. 21.
27. See in the yet unpublished documents from the Venetian State Archives by G. Valentini, 1453, Xl, 5, Sen., Mar., Ro5, C.ll (10) t.
28. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 674.
29. J. Radonic, Djuradj Kastriot Skenderbeg i Albanija u XV veku (Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Spomenik XCV, drugi razred 74) (Belgrade, 1942), Doc. No. 1.
30. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 29.
31. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 3.
32. Ibid. Doc. No. 4.
33. Cf. A. E. Vakalopoulos, Historia tou Neou Hellenismou, (History of Modern Hellenism) (Thessaloniki, 1964), II, pp. 56-58.
34. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 30.
35. J. Radonic, op. cit.. Doc. No. 5.
36. Ibid.
37. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 30.
38. Ibid.
39. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit, (Munich, 1953), p. 55.
40. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 20.
41. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . . ," p. 122.
42. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675 and 'Timariotes chretiens . .. ,"p. 122.
43. Ibid, pp. 118-120.
44. Cf. M. Sufflay, "Die Kirchenzustande ...,"p. 189.
45. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675.
46. N. Iorga, op. cit., p. 270; H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . .,"p. 124.
47. Cf. ibid. p. 131.
48. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . .” pp. 128-129 and "Arnawutluk," p. 675; C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben, 11, 1, pp. 154 and 171.
49. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675.
50. F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiten, p. 9.
51. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675. The authors of Historia e Shqiperise Vellim i Pare (Universiteti Shteteror i Tiranes, Instituti i Historise dhe I Gjuhesise), (Tirana, 1959), writing about Skenderbeg in the period 1438-1440, mention "new documents discovered recently testify" (p. 271), they do not give the slightest explanation as to the documents themselves. It is evident that they refer to H. Inalcik and to F. S. Noli's work (p. 31), the latter being questionable.
52. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
53. See A.-P. Pechayre, "L’archeveche d’Ochrida de 1394 a 1767. A propos d'un ouvrage recent," Echos d'Orient, 39 (janvier-mars 1936), p. 188. The work reviewed is by I. Snegarov, Istorija na okridskata arkiepiskopija-patriarchija (1394-1767), (Sofia, 1924).
54. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer, p. 56, See for the names of the lords who attended it F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
55. Ibid, p. 37.
56. lbid.
57. Ibid. p. 39.
58. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 12.
59. Cf. C. Jirecek, Geschuhte der Serben, 11. I, pp. 188 189; J. Radonic, op. cit., p. III.
60. ibid., Doc. No. 17. F. S. Noli has misinterpreted the document by saying that the Venetians "after trying in vain to find an assassin who would murder Skenderbeg for an annual pension of 100 ducats"(p. 40) for the offer was made by the would-be assassin.
61. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 18.
62. See for conditions ibid., Doc. No. 22.
63. Ibid., Doc. No. 23.
64. Ibid., Doc. No. 69.
65. Ibid., Doc. No. 247.
66. Ibid., Doc. No. 248.
67. Ibid., Doc No. 253.
68. Ibid., Doc. Nos. 273, 274; F. Pall, op. cit., p. 135 and note 49.
69. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer . . . , p. 162.
70. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
71. F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 162.
72. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
73. F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 162.
74. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 52.
75. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 141 and Doc. 11.
76. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 16
77. Cf. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 38.
78. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 49.
79. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 91 and 92.
80. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 57-59; F. Pall, op. cit., pp. 148-149; J.Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 195, 196, 197, 198-200, 207-220, 221
81. F. Pall, op. cit., Doc. XV11: "Et vole fare la guerra al modo suo, cioe amazare chi gli venue alle mane et non fare present."
82. Ibid., p. 149.
83. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
84. See ibid., pp. 60-61. The passage in the Commentaries which has been used as a basis is the following description of Skenderbeg’s army: "... lightly armed cavalry, swift horsemen, good for looting and plundering, but useless for warfare according to the Italian style, and helpless against our spears" (F. S. Noli, p. 60; the original in Pius II, CommentaryRerum Memorabilium,[Rome, 1584], p. 302). But the Commentarii were written partly by Pius II.
85. F. Pall, op. cit., Doc. LIII.
86. Ibid., p. 150 and Doc. XIX.
87. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
88. Ibid., p. 150.
89. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 73.
90.See 3. Radonic, op. cit., p. IV; M. Sciambra, G. Valentini, 1. Parrino, "L’Albania e Skanderbeg nelpiano generate di Crociata di Callisto III (1455-1458)," Bolletino della Badia greca di Grotta-ferrata XXI (1967), 84-85 and note 6.
91. J. Radonic, op. cit., p. IV.
92. Ibid. and Doc. No. 40.
93. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 40.
94. Ibid., Doc. Nos. 36 and 60.
95. See in the yet unpublished documents from the Venetian State Archives by G. Valentini, 1451.XII.3, Sen., Mar, R°4, C.96 (95) t.
96. Cf. M. Sciambra and others, op. cit., p. 106.
97. Ibid., p. 105.
98. Ibid., p. 106.
99. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 138.
100. Cf. M. Sciambra and others, op. cit., pp. 107 and 109.
101. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 105.
102. Ibid., Doc. No. 102.
103. M. Scimabra and others, op. cit., p. 114 and note 148.
104. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 150.
105. Ibid., Doc. No. 151.
106. Ibid., Doc. No. 152; Sciambra and others, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
107. Ibid.. pp. 118-121.
108. Cf. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 127.
109. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 193.
110. Ibid.. Doc. No. 174.
111. F. Pall, op. cit., p. VI.
112. Ibid., p. 140; J. Radonic, op. cit., p. VI.
113. Ibid., Doc. No. 257.
114. Cf. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 133.
115. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 285.
116. Ibid., Doc. No. 307.
117. Ibid., Doc. No. 130.
118. Ibid., Doc. No. 340.
119. See F. Pall, op. cit., p. 143.
120. Ibid., pp. 143, 145-146; J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 344, 349.
121. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 143.
122. Ibid., Doc. LXXVII and LXXVIII.
123. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. 353.
124. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 147.
125. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 367.
126. Ibid., Doc. No. 369.
127. F. S. Noli. op. cit., p. 70.
128. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 204, 314.
129. Ibid., Doc. No. 389.
The Italian version of this paper was published in Atti, V Convegno Internationale di Studi Albanesi, Palermo, 1969, pp. 83-105. The translation appears here for the first time.
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